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As organizations globalize to reach new markets and achieve higher production 
and sourcing efficiencies in recent decades, supply chain design and planning play an 
increasingly important role in moving materials and products throughout the 
organizations’ supply chains. An appropriate design and planning of supply chains for 
an organization can squeeze out the inefficiencies of the activities in the supply chain 
and an amount of savings is achieved consequently. Therefore, it is significant to carry 
out a deeper investigation in model development and algorithm design for supply 
chain design and planning to enhance the efficiencies of the activities in supply chains. 
It thus forms the focus of this thesis.  
First of all, this thesis reviews the state of art on the supply chain design and 
planning. This literature review is classified into domestic supply chain design and 
planning, which includes supply chain network equilibrium models and competitive 
facility location problems, and global supply chain planning.  
With respect to the domestic supply chain design and planning, the research of 
this thesis starts from supply chain network equilibrium (SCNE) models. An alterative 
formulation is provided for the SCNE models (Nagurney et al., 2002; Dong et al., 
2004) which are formulated by variational inequalities (VIs) and solved by the 
modified projection method. It overcomes the difficulty in obtaining an appropriate 
step size for the projection method to ensure convergence. Subsequently, an SCNE 






extension to SCNE model since production capacities do have significant impacts on 
the decisions of manufacturers. A Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC) model is subsequently developed for a competitive facility 
location problem, applying the SCNE model with production capacity constraints to 
derive the equilibrium state of the market. It is a novel application of SCNE model. 
Moreover, it is the first time a study is done on competitive facility location for a three 
level supply chain.  
With respect to the global supply chain planning, a chance constrained 
programming model is established for a multiperiod global supply chain planning 
with consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty. This model can capture 
the impact of fluctuation of international characteristics such as exchange rates and 
demand uncertainty on decisions such as transfer pricing and the after-tax profit of a 
multinational company (MNC). It should be pointed out that this chance constrained 
programming model is for only one MNC. Hence, in the last part of this thesis, a 
generalized Nash game model is developed for studying the competition of several 
MNCs that produce substitutable products. To our best knowledge, it is the first game-
theoretical model that considers transfer pricing, different gradual tax brackets of 
different countries and other international characteristics which do affect the decisions 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Developments in the field of production management since World War II have 
been limited to the improvement of activities related to production control and design 
in individual functional areas such as inventory management, planning and scheduling 
of manufacturing activities, modeling and evaluation of manufacturing systems, 
layout problems, group technology, system design approaches, and design and control 
of information flows. In those years, manufacturers mainly concentrated on the 
production technology revolutions. In recent decades, as organizations globalize to 
reach new markets and achieve higher production and sourcing efficiencies, supply 
chain management have played an increasingly important role in moving materials 
and products throughout the organizations’ supply chains. Effective decisions of 
supply chain can give an organization benefits such as distribution savings, greater 
control of business, better customer service and satisfaction, and reduction in capital 
investment in facilities, equipment and information technology.  
Nowadays, the definition of a supply chain can legitimately be broad or narrow, 
depends on the perspective of the “definer”. In this dissertation, a supply chain is 
defined as an integrated process wherein a number of various business entities, such 
as suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, customers, work together in an effort to: (1) 
acquire raw materials, (2) convert these raw materials into specified final products, 
and (3) deliver these final products to customers (Beamon, 1998). This chain, as 
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shown in figure 1.1, is traditionally characterized by a forward flow of materials and a 
backward flow of information. 
 
Figure 1.1 An example of supply chains 
 
Generally, decisions of supply chain can be divided into three levels in terms of 
planning horizon: strategic level, tactical level and operational level (Goetschalckx et 
al., 2002). The strategic level usually considers time horizons of more than one year, 
including the determination of facility locations, production technologies and facility 
capacities. Normally it is denoted as supply chain design. The tactical level focuses on 
material flow management policies such as production levels at each plant, assembly 
policy, inventory levels and lot sizes. Normally it is termed as supply chain planning. 
The operational level, which is always denoted as supply chain execution or 
implementation, schedules operations to assure in-time delivery of final products to 
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customers, coordinating the logistics network to be responsive to customer demands. 
This thesis only studies strategic level and tactical level decisions of supply chain, 
namely, supply chain design and planning. Up to date, mathematical models are 
widely used in supply chain decisions. For example, they are widely used in demand 
forecasting and data mining. Model practitioners always develop optimization models 
to better understand functional relations in the company and the outside world 
(Shapiro, 2007). An appropriate design and planning of supply chains for an 
organization can squeeze out the inefficiencies of the activities in the supply chain and 
a certain amount of savings is achieved consequently. As such, it is worth conducting 
research on the models and algorithms of supply chain design and planning.  
1.2 Objectives 
This thesis focuses on the supply chain design and planning, which are 
approached broadly from two perspectives, domestic supply chain and global supply 
chain. The former one refers to supply chain design and planning without 
consideration of international characteristics such as currency exchange rates, import 
duties and local contents, while the later one refers to supply chain planning taking 
those international features into account.  
1.2.1 Domestic supply chain 
The study on domestic supply chain in this thesis focuses on the models, 
algorithms and applications of supply chain network equilibrium (SCNE) models. 
SCNE models are originally proposed by Nagurney and her collaborators in 2002. 
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They have been widely used in supply chain studies such as reverse logistics 
(Nagurney and Toyasaki, 2005) and global supply chain planning (Nagurney et al, 
2003). Therefore, it is worth exploring the alternative formulation and algorithm for 
the SCNE models.  
The SCNE models (Nagurney, et al., 2002; Dong et al., 2004) are formulated by 
variational inequalities (VIs) and solved by the modified projection method. At each 
iteration of the modified projection method a predetermined step size is needed to 
implement the projection. However, a universal step size guaranteeing the 
convergence of the modified projection method does not exist because it relies on the 
unknown Lipschitz constant of the vector function entering a VI formulation. In other 
words, while implementing the modified projection method, it is a challenging issue 
to obtain a desirable step size. Therefore, Chapter 3 transforms the SCNE models to 
unconstrained minimization problems by using Fischer function (Fischer, 1992).  
Hence quasi-Newton algorithm can be applied to solve this problem. It should be 
pointed out that the technique proposed in Chapter 3 is not only applicable to the two 
cases studied in Chapter 3, but to all of the other SCNE models because all of these 
SCNE models were formulated by VIs defined on nonnegative orchant (e.g. Nagurney, 
et al., 2003 and Nagurney and Toyasaki, 2005).  
In addition, a manufacturing facility, in fact, should have the production capacity 
constraint, i.e., a limit on the amount of the product produced during a time period, 
due to the limited resources. However, the SCNE model (Nagurney et al., 2002) does 
not take into account production capacities for manufacturers. Hence, Chapter 4 
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extends the SCNE model to an SCNE model with production capacity constraints.  
Competitive facility location problems are to make decisions on facility locations 
for companies while taking into account the interactions between location decisions 
and market forces. Up to now only the spatial price equilibrium (SPE) (Nagurney, 
1999) model or Cournot-Nash Oligopolistic equilibrium model is applied in 
competitive facility location problems to describe the economic equilibrium state of 
the market. Tobin and Friesz (1986) proposed the competitive facility location issue 
that is able to quantitatively take into account the market competition to some extent. 
They developed a generalized bilevel programming model for the competitive facility 
location problem, in which the lower level problem is the SPE model or Cournot-
Nash Oligopolistic equilibrium model that characterizes the economic equilibrium 
state of the market in response to the facility location decision of an entering firm.  
After a series of explorations in depth (Friesz et al., 1988 and 1989; Miller et al. 
1992), Miller et al. (1996) contributed a monograph on the competitive facility 
location problems with SPE constraints, and pointed out that bilevel programming 
models and sensitivity analysis based heuristic methods can provide a solution to the 
competitive facility location problem. However, although the SPE model or Cournot-
Nash Oligopolistic equilibrium model can quantify the supply and demand 
equilibrium conditions, it is incompetent on capturing economic equilibrium 
conditions of a supply chain comprising manufacturers, retailers and consumers with 
free-market competition. As such, a novel and interesting research issue regarding the 
competitive facility location on the decentralized supply chains has emerged. In 
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Chapter 4, after obtaining the SCNE model with production capacity constraints, a 
Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) model for a 
competitive facility location problem was developed, applying the SCNE model with 
production capacity constraints to derive the economic equilibrium state of a supply 
chain comprising manufacturers, retailers and demand markets.  
1.2.2 Global supply chain  
The objective of study on global supply chain in this thesis is to conduct research 
on some new global supply chain planning issues.  
As is known, transfer pricing and the allocation of overhead of a multinational 
company (MNC) can shift profit of its subsidiaries located in high-tax countries to its 
subsidiaries located in low-tax countries. These thus would increase the after-tax 
profit of this MNC. Transfer price here is defined as the price that a selling 
department, division, or subsidiary of a company charges for a product or service 
supplied to a buying department, division or subsidiary of the same company 
(Abdallah, 1989). Although some articles conducted research on this issue (Cohen et 
al, 1989; Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2001 and Wilhelm et al., 2005), they ignore that 
currency exchange rates may fluctuate over a taxation period. This fluctuation may 
affect the decisions of MNCs. Moreover, the market demand considered in the three 
articles was assumed to be deterministic. Therefore, in Chapter 5 a chance constrained 
programming model was proposed for a multiperiod production- distribution planning 
for an MNC with consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty.  
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In reality, MNCs that produce substitutable products may compete with each 
other. For instance, in the personal computer industry, three giant MNCs - Dell, 
Hewlett-Packard and Lenovo - are competing with each other worldwide because they 
assemble highly substitutable desktop computers in their plants and sell them to 
consumers via their distribution centers (DCs). To be more competitive, these 
companies have already put their plants and DCs in different countries or territories, 
which form a two-echelon global supply chain concerning international features such 
as currency exchange rates, import duties, transfer prices, tax brackets and 
transportation cost allocation. However, to the best of our knowledge, up to now no 
academic research has been conducted on the competition of the MNCs that minimize 
their respective after-tax profit through transfer pricing and allocating the 
transportation cost among their respective subsidiaries. Hence, in Chapter 6 a 
generalized Nash game model is proposed to analyze the competition among MNCs 
that produce substitutable products with consideration of transfer pricing, allocation 
of transportation cost and gradual tax brackets.  
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive literature review of the SCNE models, 
competitive facility location problems and global supply chain planning.  
Chapter 3 transforms the VI formulation for the SCNE models into unconstrained 
minimization problems. Subsequently, the quasi-Newton algorithm is applied to solve 
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them. An illustrative numerical example is presented to evaluate the convergence of 
quasi-Newton algorithm and the modified projection method. Furthermore, ten 
benchmark numerical examples are applied to compare the computational time of 
quasi-Newton method and the modified projection method.  
Chapter 4 first proposes an SCNE model with production capacity constraints. 
Based on this model, it develops an MPEC model for a competitive facility location 
problem. GA incorporated with LQP P-C method is designed to solve this MPEC 
model. Finally, sensitivity analysis of the facility investment budget is studied.  
Chapter 5 focuses on a multiperiod production-distribution planning for an MNC 
taking into consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty. A chance-
constrained programming model is developed to formulate this problem. Since the 
objective function is nondifferentiable and it is difficult to evaluate the violation of 
chance constraints, a heuristic that is a penalty method embedded with simulated 
annealing procedure is proposed to solve this model. Furthermore, a numerical 
example is employed to evaluate the impact of demand uncertainty and confidence 
levels of chance constraints on the after-tax profit, and ten randomly generated 
numerical examples are used to access the computational time of the heuristic.  
Chapter 6 presents a generalized Nash game model to analyze the competition of 
MNCs that produce substitutable products by taking into account transfer pricing, 
allocation of transportation cost and gradual tax brackets for each MNC. Two 
heuristic algorithms are proposed to solve this model. The impact of change of 
currency exchange rates and gradual tax brackets on the equilibrium state are studied. 
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Furthermore, the convergence of these two heuristic algorithms is investigated by 
using 20 numerical examples.  
Chapter 7 gives conclusions of this study, contribution of this thesis, and some 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, a comprehensive literature review of the researches in this thesis 
is presented. The review is classified into two sections: the review of domestic supply 
chain and the review of global supply chain. The review of domestic supply chain 
includes the models and algorithms of SCNE models and competitive facility location 
problems, while the review of global supply chain focuses on the models and 
algorithms for global supply chain design and planning.  
2.1 Domestic Supply Chain  
In this thesis, the research of domestic supply chain design and planning focuses 
on the models, algorithms and the application of SCNE models. With reference to the 
application of SCNE models, SCNE models was applied to study competitive facility 
location problems. Therefore, firstly, a literature review of SCNE models is presented 
in 2.1.1. Subsequently, a literature review of competitive facility location problems is 
presented in 2.1.2.   
2.1.1 Supply chain network equilibrium models 
The definition of SCNE was originally proposed by Nagurney and her 
collaborators in 2002. It describes an equilibrium state for a three-echelon supply 
chain comprising manufacturers, retailers and the customers. The manufacturers 
produce substitutable products and supply them to the retailers. In order to maximize 
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his profit, each manufacturer makes decision on the production amount and the 
amount of shipment supplied to each retailer. The retailers, in turn, receive the 
products from the manufacturers and supply them to demand markets. In order to 
maximize his profit, each retailer also makes decision on the amount of shipment 
supplied to each demand market. The customers, finally, at each demand market will 
determine the amount of products bought from each retailer according to the price that 
they are willing to pay, the price charged by the retailers and the transaction cost. 
These noncooperative behaviors of manufacturers, retailers and the customers at 
demand markets drive the supply chain to an equilibrium state, namely, the SCNE. At 
equilibrium, each entity of the three-echelon supply chain cannot increase his own 
profit by changing his decision unilaterally. A VI formulation was developed to obtain 
the SCNE solution. The sufficient condition of the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium was obtained and the modified projection method was applied to solve 
this SCNE model.  
Subsequently, SCNE model is widely used for analyzing various supply chain 
issues. Nagurney et al. (2003) applied it in global supply chain by incorporating 
currency exchange rate into the VI formulation. Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) 
obtained the SCNE solution for a supernetwork in which manufacturers not only 
supply products to retailers through physical links, but also supply products to 
demand markets directly through internet links. Also the environmental criteria were 
considered in this model, namely, the generated emission was incorporated into the 
objective function of manufacturers and retailers by assigning a negative weight. In 
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addition, Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005) applied the idea of SCNE for a reverse 
supply chain management and electronic waste recycling problem in which the 
reverse supply chain consists of four tiers: sources, recyclers, processors and demand 
market.  
Moreover, the idea of SCNE was also applied in studying electric power supply 
chain instead of traditional supply chain which always consists of such as 
manufacturers, retailers and demand markets (Wu et al., 2006, Nagurney et al.,2006, 
Nagurney et al.,2007), studying internet advertising (Zhao et al., 2008) as well as 
studying financial networks (Nagurney and Ke, 2006, Cruz et al., 2006).  
It should be pointed out that the market demands in the above articles about 
SCNE are assumed to be deterministic. However, sometimes the demand cannot be 
predicted precisely. Therefore, it is necessary to study the SCNE with demand 
uncertainty. Dong et al. (2004) addressed an SCNE model with random demands. 
They assumed that the demand faced by each retailer is uncertain and developed a VI 
formulation for the SCNE model with random demands. Moreover, Dong et al. (2005) 
derived the SCNE solution of a four-echelon supply chain consisting of manufacturers, 
distributors, retailers and demand markets. This is the first SCNE model that captured 
both multicriteria decision-making and decision-making under uncertainty. More 
specifically, each manufacturer is not only focused on the profit, but also on the 
market share. Nonnegative weights were assigned to the market share and the 
objective of each manufacturer was to maximize a combination of profit and market 
share. The distributor was concerned with the profit, the transportation time and the 
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service level and wanted to maximize a combination of these three objectives by 
assigning weights to these objectives. The retailers, in turn, wanted to maximize their 
respective profit while facing demand uncertainty at demand markets. Subsequently, 
Nagurney and Matsypura (2005) obtained the equilibrium solution of a four-echelon 
supply chain: manufacturers, distributors, retailers and demand markets. They 
considered not only the uncertainty of demand, but also the supply risk of 
manufacturers and distributors.  
Overall, SCNE models have been being an interesting research topic nowadays. 
However, these SCNE models were formulated by VI formulations and solved by the 
modified projection method. While implementing the modified projection method, a 
predetermined step size is needed to guarantee the convergence of it. Up to now no 
efficient strategy but trial-and-error can derive such a step size. Furthermore, in some 
cases the required step size does not exist. In other words, a universal step size for 
guaranteeing the convergence of the modified projection method for solving the 
SCNE models is difficult to derive.  
In addition, production capacities of manufacturers are necessary constraints in 
supply chain design and planning. They may affect the SCNE solution. However, the 
SCNE models have not taken into account the production capacity constraints.  
2.1.2 Competitive facility location problems 
Competitive facility location problems aim to make decisions on facility location 
for companies while taking into account the interactions between location decisions 
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and market forces. A common assumption of it is that all of the facilities, whether 
newly located or already existed, are producing one homogeneous or substitutable 
product and compete with each other. In general, in competitive facility location 
problems, the decision variables include the location of facilities and the outputs of 
each facility. Sometimes the prices of these outputs at each facility are taken as 
decision variables.  
Generally speaking, there are four major components for competitive facility 
location problems. The first component is the space, namely, whether the space 
available to the companies for locating a facility is discrete or continuous. Discrete 
spaces are always represented by the nodes of a supply chain or transportation 
network, while continuous spaces are always described by a space in a coordinate 
system whose dimension is no more than 3. The second component specifies the 
market rules which indicate whether the market is initially empty and all competitors 
enter the market simultaneously, or there already exist some competitors and an 
entering firm dedicates to enter the market. In Table 2.1 these two rules were termed 
as “simultaneously” and “sequentially”, respectively.  
The third component considered in competitive facility location problems is the 
behaviors of customers. This term refers to how customers choose products. For 
instance, some customers may choose the cheapest products, some may choose the 
products which are nearest to them. The fourth and the last major descriptor is that of 
the objectives such as profits, market shares, investment ratio and service level of the 
decision makers. The history of competitive facility location problems dates back to 
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the seminal paper authored by Hotelling in 1929. It sparked a good deal of activity at 
that time, including the papers authored by Hoover (1936), Lerner and Singer (1937) 
and Smithies (1941). After an ebb in the following three decades, up until the early 
1970s, a resurgence of interest in competitive facility location problems appears from 
late 1970s to date. To summarize, a considerable body of representative articles for 
competitive facility location problems is presented in Table 2.1 according to the four 
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Table 2.1 Major components considered in selected competitive facility location 
models  
Paper Space Market rules Customers Objectives 
Hotelling 
(1929) 
Continuous Simultaneously Price Profit 
Hakimi 
(1983) 









Continuous Simultaneously Price Profit 
Lederer and 
Hurter (1986) 
Continuous Simultaneously Price Profit 
Lederer and 
Thisse (1990) 
Discrete Simultaneously Price and 
marginal cost 
Profit 














In the models listed in Table 2.1, customers choose the products according to the 
factors such as prices, distances and costs. On the other hand, there is another way to 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 17
describe the behaviors of the customers and the supply entities in supply chains, 
namely, to integrate or link an economic equilibrium model with a fixed demand 
facility location model to create a bilevel programming model or an MPEC model for 
competitive facility location problems.  
Tobin and Friesz proposed a bilevel programming model in 1986 to formulate a 
competitive facility location problem for a firm who wants to locate its supply 
facilities to maximize his profit. After locating the facilities, the market, which 
consists of suppliers and customers, followed SPE or Cournot-Nash Oligopolistic 
equilibrium (Nagurney, 1999). A heuristic algorithm that is to transfer the bilevel 
programming model to a single level programming model by using sensitivity 
analysis was developed to solve this model. Subsequently, Friesz et al. (1988) 
developed another exact algorithm to solve the model and the existence theory for the 
model was studied by Friesz et al. in 1989. Finally, Miller et al. (1992) expands the 
competitive facility location model developed by Friesz in 1986 by introducing some 
transshipment nodes. It should be pointed out that these competitive facility location 
problems are concerned with a supply chain with only two levels: sellers and buyers. 
Nowadays, as companies globalize, supply chain becomes more and more complex. It 
does not include only sellers and buyers. Therefore, it is worth conducting research on 
the competitive facility location problems by linking the SCNE model (Nagurney et 
al., 2002) and the fixed demand location models.  
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 18
2.2 Global Supply Chain  
In recent years, decision makers of companies have been seeking out 
international manufacturing sources because of reduced cost, increased revenues and 
improved reliability. For instance, manufacturers set up factories in foreign countries 
to benefit from tariff and trade concessions, low cost direct labor, capital subsidies 
and reduced logistics cost. Comparing to domestic supply chain, global supply chain 
is more difficult to manage because many international components such as corporate 
income taxes (Hodder and Dincer, 1986; Arntzen et al., 1995), duties (Breitman and 
Lucas, 1987; Cancel and Khumawala, 1996; Lowe et al., 2002), currency exchange 
rates (Cohen and Lee, 1989; Haug, 1992; Nagurney et al., 2003), trade barriers 
(Breitman and Lucas, 1987; Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997;) and transfer prices 
(Cohen et al, 1989; ; Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2001; Wilhelm et al, 2005) need to be 
taken into account.  
From modeling point of view, mixed integer programming (MIP) is the most 
useful approach for global supply chain design and planning. They are always solved 
by applying branch-and-bound algorithm or meta-heuristics such as GA. In addition, 
there are some other approaches which are applied in global supply chain design and 
planning, e.g. dynamic programming for multiperiod problems, solved by forward or 
backward recursion, VI formulation solved by the modified projection method and 
game-theoretical approach (Tombak, 1995; Dasu and de la Torre, 1997) for analyzing 
competition in global supply chains.  
The objectives that are considered in global supply chain design and planning are 
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also diversified. Since different tax authorities gain different corporate income tax 
rates, a typical objective function in global supply chain design and planning is to 
maximize the after-tax, even is to maximize the mean-variance of the after-tax profit 
while involving stochastic issue in global supply chain design and planning. In 
addition, lead time is another important issue in global supply chain design and 
planning because the shipments always move across borders for such a long distance. 
Hence, in some cases the objective is to minimize the weighted activity time. Besides, 
the other objectives in global supply chain design and planning are more or less the 
same as the objectives in domestic supply chain design and planning, for instance, to 
minimize sum of various costs. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the approaches used in global supply chain design and 
planning, and the objectives of the models for some typical articles. It should be 
pointed out that for modeling approach in Table 2.2, MIP refers to mixed integer 
programming, Dynamic refers to dynamic programming, Game theory refers to game-
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Table 2.2 Approaches and objectives of global supply chain design and planning 
Article Modeling approach Objective 
Hodder and Dincer, 1986 MIP Maximize mean-variance 
of the after-tax profit 
Breitman and Lucas, 1987 MIP Maximize profit 
Haug, 1992 MIP Minimize sum of various 
costs 
Kougut and Kulatilaka, 1994 Dynamic Minimize sum of various 
costs 
Arntzen et al., 1995 MIP Minimize the 
combination of weighted 
cost and transportation 
time 
Tombak, 1995 Game theory Maximize profit 
Canel and Khumawala, 1996 MIP Maximize after-tax profit 
Huchzermeier and Cohen, 1996 Dynamic Maximize after-tax profit 
Dasu and de la Torre, 1997 Game theory Maximize profit 
Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997 MIP Minimize sum of 
production and purchase 
cost 
Kouvelis et al., 2001 Dynamic Maximize profit 
Nagurney et al., 2003 VI Maximize profit 
Souza et al., 2004 MIP Maximize profit 
Nagurney and Matsypura, 2005 VI Maximize profit 
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From the point of view of the factors that may affect global supply chain design 
and planning, there are two kinds of factors, deterministic factors and stochastic 
factors. Deterministic factors include such as production costs, transportation costs, 
transportation modes, inventory costs and capacities while stochastic factors include 
such as market demands, currency exchange rates and market prices. Early research 
on the stochastic issues of global supply chain appears in Hodder and Jucker (1982 & 
1985) and Hodder and Dincer (1986). They stated that the market price of the 
products and the currency exchange rates are uncertain and utilize mean-variance 
approach to measure the decision maker’s risk. Since the problems in these papers are 
single period problem, they cannot measure the impact of the fluctuation of currency 
exchange rate on global supply chain design and planning. Other articles taking into 
account uncertain currency exchange rates in global supply chain design and planning 
include such as Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) and Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996). 
Both of them assume that currency exchange rate follows a Wiener process and hence 
the currency exchange rate in each discrete time depends on the currency exchange 
rate in the previous period. Except for the exchange rate and price, many other 
random features such as uncertain demand (Sodhi, 2005) and political risk (Nagurney 
and Matsypura, 2005) have been explored in global supply chain design and planning.  
In general, there are two savings potential while planning a global supply chain. 
One is the difference of cost, such as production cost, labor cost and transportation 
cost, in different countries or territories (e.g. Hodder and Dincer, 1986; Arntzen et al., 
1995; Huchzermeier and Cohen, 1996; Kouvelis et al., 2001 and Souza et al., 2004). 
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These factors may help to decrease the cost much more than in domestic issues 
because the costs between countries, especially developing countries and developed 
countries, are quite different. Another saving originates from the tax savings. More 
specifically, since the tax rates in different countries are different, it is possible to shift 
the profit from the subsidiaries in high-tax countries to the subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries through transfer pricing and allocating overhead of an MNC (Cohen et al, 
1989, Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2001). In 2005, Wilhelm and his collaborators stated 
that corporate tax rate of the profit is not a constant, but a step-wise function of the 
profit. Namely, it is more applicable to include gradual tax brackets in global supply 
chain planning while considering transfer pricing and allocation of transportation cost 
to reduce income tax. 
The three articles studying transfer pricing for an MNC cannot capture the 
fluctuation of currency exchange rate on global supply chain planning. Moreover, 
they assumed that the demand at the demand market was deterministic. However, in 
most of the cases the demand cannot be predicted precisely. Therefore, it is worth 
conducting research on a multiperiod supply chain planning for an MNC with the 
consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty. 
On the other hand, so far the global supply chain planning with consideration of 
transfer pricing is for only one MNC. In other words, it is for a centralized supply 
chain. In reality, MNCs that produce substitutable products always compete with each 
other. In other words, the global supply chain is decentralized. To the best of our 
knowledge, the first result on competition for the global supply chain planning was 
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developed by Tombak (1995). With linear demand assumption, Tombak (1995) 
proposed a deterministic differentiable game-theoretical model to analyze when 
MNCs would switch from exporting to producing at an onshore plant for the case of 
two MNCs. It aims to determine Nash equilibrium timing patterns with resorting to 
Cournot equilibrium production quantity and selling price at each period. However, 
Tombak (1995) disregarded the unique and important international features that 
definitely have vital impact on planning a global supply chain. With currency 
exchange rates, tariff rates and transfer prices, Dasu and Torre (1997) developed a 
static Nash game model to characterize the equilibrium solution of the decentralized 
global supply chain in the context of textile fiber producers in Latin American, in 
which each MNC attempted to maximize his own profit without consideration of tax 
issues. These two game models unfortunately ignore the income tax rates published 
by countries involved in the decentralized global supply chain and transportation cost 
allocation ratios between plants and DCs belonged to the same MNC. These two 
international features not only affect after-profit of an MNC but also make global 
supply chain planning fairly different in model development and algorithm design. 
Overall, it is necessary to propose a game-theoretical model for MNCs that produce 
substitutable products and compete with each other with the consideration of transfer 
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CHAPTER 3 REFORMULATING SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK 
EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an alternative formulation and solution algorithm for the SCNE 
model (Nagurney et al., 2002) and the SCNE model with demand uncertainty (Dong 
et al., 2004) are provided. Moreover, 11 numerical examples are used to evaluate this 
solution algorithm suggested in this chapter.  
3.2 Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Models  
In this section, the SCNE model (Nagurney et al., 2002 & Dong et al., 2004) are 
introduced. Let us consider a three-tier decentralized supply chain network 
comprising manufacturers, retailers and consumers for a homogenous or substitutable 
product, depicted by Figure 3.1 (Nagurney et al., 2002). In the network, nodes in the 
top tier represent manufacturer producing the product, and nodes in the middle tier 
denote retailers who purchase a certain amount of the product from the manufacturers 
and then sell them to consumers located at the demand markets shown in the bottom 
tier. Directed links indicate transportation and/or transaction relations of the product 
among the decision-makers in the supply chain. Assume that there are m 
manufacturers, n retailers and o demand markets in the supply chain. Without loss of 
generality, a typical manufacturer, retailer and demand market are denoted by 
notations i, j, k, respectively. 









1 k o Demand Markets" "
 
Figure 3.1 Network structure of the supply chain with deterministic demands 
 
The aim of manufacturer i is to maximize his profit by determining his production 
output denoted by iq , shipment of the product shipped or transacted to retailer j  
denoted by ijq . Cost for producing the product of manufacturer i  can be in general 
described by function ( )if q , where ( )1, , mq q q= "  is the row vector of production 
outputs of all manufacturers in the supply chain. The transaction cost of the product 
between manufacturer i  and retailer j  is characterized by function ( )ij ijc q . It is 
assumed that the quantity of the product produced by manufacturer i  is equal to the 







q q i m
=
= =∑ "  (3.1) 
For the notational convenience, let 1Q  be the mn-dimensional row vector of all 
product shipments between manufacturers and retailers, i.e., ( )1 , ,ijQ q= " " , 
1, ,i m= "  and 1, ,j n= " . As such, production cost function ( )if q  for manufacturer 
i  can be alternatively regarded as a function of vector 1Q , i.e. ( )1if Q , according to 
eqn. (3.1).  
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It is assumed that the manufacturers as the profit-maximizers in the supply chain 
compete in a noncooperative fashion (Nash game) and that supply price of the product 
is identified according to the marginal-cost pricing principle. Furthermore, Assumed 
that the production cost function and the transaction cost function for each 
manufacturer are continuously differentiable and convex. The product quantities and 
shipments of all manufacturers in the equilibrium state following the Nash game-
theoretical principle can be thus determined by solving the VI (Nagurney et al., 2002): 
Find a vector 1* mnQ +∈ℜ  satisfying the inequality:  
 
( ) ( )1* * * * 1
1
1 1
0,   
m n
i ij ij mn
ij ij ij
i j ij ij
f Q c q
q q Q
q q += =
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ − × − ≥ ∀ ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑∑ ρ  (3.2) 
where mn+ℜ  is the nonnegative orthant in the mn-dimensional real space mnℜ .  
3.2.1 Deterministic demand case 
Consumers grouped into different demand markets in the supply chain consume 
the product according to their own consumption behaviors. With regard to demand 
market k, the consumers’ consumption behavior for the product is assumed to be 
governed by deterministic demand function ( )3kd ρ  , where the o-dimensional row 
vector ( )3 31 3 3, , , ,k o= " "ρ ρ ρ ρ  in which 3kρ  denotes unit price of the product that 
consumers in demand market k ( 1, ,k o= " ) are willing to pay. Under the supply 
chain network structure shown in Figure 3.1, consumers purchase the product from 
retailers. Let jkq  be the quantity of the product bought from retailer j  by consumers 
in demand market k , and let 2Q  be the no-dimensional row vector of all product 
flows between retailers and demand markets, i.e., ( )2 , ,jkQ q= " " , 1, ,j n= "  and 
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1, ,k o= " . When the consumers make their consumption decisions on the product, 
the transaction cost to obtain the product from a retailer should be also considered. 
Let function ( )2jkc Q  denote unit transaction cost of the product from retailer j to 
consumers in the demand market k. The spatial price equilibrium conditions for 
consumers located at all demand markets in the supply chain, thus, can be governed 
by the following VI (Nagurney et al., 2002):  
Find a vector ( )2* 3, no oQ ++ρ ∈ℜ  such that  
 
( )
( ) ( )
* 2* * *
2 3
1 1
* * * 2








jk k k k
k j






⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ρ + −ρ × − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦




where no o++ℜ  is the nonnegative orthant in the (no+o)-dimensional real space no o+ℜ , 
and *2 jρ  is the price charged for the product by retailer j.  
Retailer j  has to simultaneously face with the manufacturers and the consumers 
in the process of transacting the product. He obtains the product from the 
manufacturers for his retail outlets from which the consumers will purchase the 
product. Nevertheless, the quantity of the product sold by retailer j does not exceed 







q q j n
= =
≤ =∑ ∑ "  (3.4) 
Various costs involved in handling the product for the retailer are called the 
handling cost described as function ( )1jc Q . Retailer j  aims to maximize its profit, 
which can be modeled by the optimization problem:  




j jk j ij ij
k i
q c Q q
= =
ρ − − ρ∑ ∑  (3.5) 
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subject to constraint (3.4). 
Assume that all retailers compete in a noncooperative manner in the retailing 
market of the product, and that the handling cost function for each retailer is 
continuously differentiable and convex. The Nash equilibrium solution for the 
retailers is thus equivalent to solving the following VI (Nagurney et al., 2002):  





* * * * * *
1 2
1 1 1 1
* * * 1 2
1 1 1
  0,     , ,
m n n o
j
ij j ij ij j j jk jk
i j j kij
n m o
mn no n
ij jk j j
j i k
c Q
q q q q
q
q q Q Q




⎡ ⎤∂ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ρ − γ × − + −ρ + γ × −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦




where mn no n+ ++ℜ  is the nonnegative orthant in (mn+no+n)-dimensional real space 
mn no n+ +ℜ , and n-dimensional row vector ( )1, , ,j nγ = γ γ γ" "  in which jγ  is 
Lagrangian multiplier with respect to constraint (3.4) in the optimization problem 
(3.5).  
The supply chain network involves three kinds of decision-makers: manufacturers, 
retailers and consumers, and they are interacted and highly correlated in the supply 
chain of the product, respectively. Nagurney et al. (2002) proposed a novel 
equilibrium concept from the point of view of entire supply chain network. The SCNE 
model with deterministic demands means that the production flows between the 
distinct tiers of the decision-makers coincide and the product flows and prices satisfy 
the sum of optimality conditions (3.2), (3.3) and (3.6). They further demonstrated that 
the SCNE model can be formulated by the following VI formulation:  
Determine a vector ( )1* 2* * *3, , , mn no n oQ Q + + ++γ ρ ∈ℜ   such that         
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0,   
n m
i ij ij j
j ij ij
i j ij ij ij
n o n m o
jk j k jk jk ij jk j j
j k j i k
o n
jk k k k
k j
f Q c q c Q
q q
q q q
c Q q q q q
q d
= =
= = = = =
= =
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ + − γ × −⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + γ −ρ × − + − × γ − γ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − ρ × ρ −ρ ≥ ∀⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∑∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ( )1 2 3, , , mn no n oQ Q + + ++γ ρ ∈ℜ
  (3.7) 
where mn no n o+ + ++ℜ  is the nonnegative orthant in the (mn+no+n+o)-dimensional real 
space mn no n o+ + +ℜ . 
Having obtained the solution for the VI (3.7), the relevant equilibrium prices for the 
product can be identified by the formulae below: 
 
( ) ( )1* ** *




f Q c q
q
q q
∂ ∂ρ = + >∂  (3.8) 








ρ = γ >∑  (3.9) 










Figure 3.2 Network structure of the supply chain with random demands 
 
Compared to the assumption of deterministic demand function utilized in the 
preceding SCNE model, it is more reasonable to assume that the demand for the 
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product at a retailer outlet is a random variable. Moreover, it is not necessary to 
differentiate the consumers across the demand markets shown in Figure 3.1. In other 
words, the supply chain network with random demands explicitly considers two tiers 
of decision-makers: manufacturers and retailers, which are intuitively illustrated in 
Figure 3.2. Let ( )2ˆ j jd ρ  be the demand for the product with the price 2 jρ  at retailer j, 
where ( )2ˆ j jd ρ  is a random variable with probability density function ( )2,j jxξ ρ . 
Therefore, the stochastic economic equilibrium conditions for all consumers in the 
market can be expressed by the following VI (Dong et al., 2004): 
Find a vector *2
n
+ρ ∈ℜ  such that  
 ( ) ( )* * *2 2 2 2
1 1
0,   
n m
n




⎛ ⎞− ρ × ρ −ρ ≥ ∀ρ ∈ℜ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (3.10) 
where ( )2 21 2 2, , ,j nρ = ρ ρ ρ" "  is the n-dimensional row vector of prices charged for 
the product by all the retailers, and ( )2j jd ρ  is the mean value of the random variable 
( )2ˆ j jd ρ , namely: 
 ( ) ( )2 2ˆ , 1, ,j j j jd E d j n⎡ ⎤ρ = ρ =⎣ ⎦ "  (3.11) 
In the case of considering the random demands, one of two cases about excess 
supply and excess demand may happen with a certain probability. Let j
+λ  be the unit 
penalty of having excess supply at retailer j and j
−λ  be the unit penalty of having 
excess demand. It is assumed that each retailer is a profit-maximizer and that all 
retailers in the supply chain compete in a noncooperative manner. The Nash 
equilibrium conditions for the retailers thus can be expressed by the VI (Dong et al., 
2004): 
Find a 1* mnQ +∈ℜ  such that 
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⎛ ⎞ρ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  is the probability that the demand for the product at retailer j is 







∑ , namely: 







j ij j j j ij j j
i i
P q d q x dx=
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∑ρ = ρ ≤ = ξ ρ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∫  (3.13) 
Dong et al. (2004) defined the SCNE conditions with random demands, which is 
an extension of the preceding the SCNE models with the deterministic demands. They 
pointed out that the equilibrium state of the supply chain with random demands is one 
where the product flows between the two tiers of the manufacturers and the retailers 
coincide and the product shipments and prices satisfy the sum of the optimality 
conditions (3.2), (3.10) and (3.12). The relevant SCNE model can be formulated as 
the VI: 
Determine a vector ( )1* *2 , mn nQ ++ρ ∈ℜ  such that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )





* * * *
2 2
1
* * * 1
2 2 2 2
1 1
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m n m
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f Q c q c Q
P q
q q q










⎡∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛ ⎞⎢ + + + λ ρ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎢ ⎝ ⎠⎣
⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤− λ +ρ − ρ × − +⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎦





where mn n++ℜ  is the nonnegative orthant in (mn+n)-dimensional real space mn n+ℜ . 
After getting the solution for eqn. (3.14), the equilibrium price of the product 
supplied to a retailer by a manufacturer can be calculated by using eqn. (3.8). 
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Investigating the existence and uniqueness of the solutions for VIs (3.7) and (3.14) is 
not the purpose of this study, but interested readers can refer to Nagurney et al. (2002) 
and Dong et al. (2004).  
3.3 Unconstrained Minimization Formulations  
According to eqns. (3.7) and (3.14), it can be easily concluded that the SCNE 
model with either deterministic demands or random demands can be formulated as a 
VI defined on a nonnegative orthant. Proposition 1.4 in Nagurney (1999) indicates 
that this kind of VI can be equivalently transformed into a nonlinear complementary 
problem (NCP). Hence, the corresponding NCP formulation for the SCNE model with 
deterministic demands is of the form: 
Find a row vector * 0X ≥  such that  
 ( ) ( )* * *0 and 0TF X F X X≥ =      (3.15) 
where row vector ( )1 2 3, , , mn no n oX Q Q + + ++= γ ρ ∈ℜ ,  and the row vector function ( )F X  : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3 4, , , : mn no n o mn no n oF X F X F X F X F X + + + + + ++= ℜ ℜ          6  (3.16) 
where vector functions: ( ) ( )( )1 1, , mnijF X F X= ∈ℜ   " "  , 
( ) ( )( )2 2, , nojkF X F X= ∈ℜ   " " , ( ) ( )( )3 3, , njF X F X= ∈ℜ   " "  and 
( ) ( )( )4 4, , okF X F X= ∈ℜ   " " . The individual entity in these four vector functions 
above is defined as follows.  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 ,   1, , ; 1, ,i jij ijij j
ij ij ij
f Q c Qc q
F X i m j n
q q q
∂ ∂∂= + + − γ = =∂ ∂ ∂
  " "  (3.17) 
 ( ) ( )2 2 3 ,    1, , ; 1, ,jk jk j kF X c Q j n k o= + γ −ρ = =  " "  (3.18) 








F X q q j n
= =
= − =∑ ∑  "  (3.19) 
 ( ) ( )4 3
1




F X q d k oρ
=
= − =∑  "  (3.20) 
With regard to VI (3.14) for the SCNE model with random demands, its NCP 
formulation takes the form: 
Find a row vector *ˆ 0X ≥  such that  
 ( ) ( )* * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 and 0TF X F X X≥ =  (3.21) 
where row vector ( )1 2ˆ , mn nX Q ρ ++= ∈ℜ  , and row vector function ( )ˆ ˆF X  is defined 
below. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, : mn n mn nF X F X F X + ++= ℜ ℜ6  (3.22) 
where ( ) ( )( )1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , mnijF X F X= ∈ℜ" "  with elements ( )1ˆ ˆijF X , 1, ,i m= "  and 
1, ,j n= " : 
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m
i jij ij
ij j ij j
iij ij ij
m
j j j ij j
i
f Q c Qc q








∂ ∂∂ ⎛ ⎞= + + + λ ρ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠




and ( ) ( )( )2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,jF X F X= " "  with the elements ( )2 ˆjF X , 1, ,j n= " : 




j ij j j
i
F X q d ρ
=
= −∑  (3.24) 
The merit function approach transforming an NCP into an unconstrained 
minimization problem is one of the efficient methods for solving NCPs (Kanzow et al., 
1997). Notice that a function which can constitute an equivalent minimization 
problem for an NCP is called a merit function. It is very surprising that the following 
simple function with two variables, introduced by Fischer (1992), plays a vital role in 
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constructing a merit function. 
 ( ) ( ) 22 2 2, :a b a b a b +⎡ ⎤φ = + − + ℜ ℜ⎣ ⎦ 6  (3.25) 
It is easy to verify that this function is continuously differentiable and it has a 
favorable property: 
 ( ), 0 if and only if 0, 0, 0a b a b a bφ = ≥ ≥ × =  (3.26) 
With regard to NCP formulation (3.15) for the SCNE model with deterministic 
demands, the nonnegative real function can be constructed as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 2
1





               , ,
m n n o
ij ij jk jk
i j j k
n o
j j k k
j k
X q F X q F X
F X F X
= = = =
= =
Ψ = φ + φ +
φ γ + φ ρ
∑∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
    
   
 (3.27) 
The following proposition is directly derived from the eqn. (3.26).  
Proposition 3.1.  ( )*1 0XΨ =  if and only if *X  is the solution of NCP 
formulation (3.15).  
Proposition 3.1 actually shows that function ( )1 XΨ   is a merit function of NCP 
formulation (3.15). As ( )1 0XΨ ≥ , thus determining a solution for NCP formulation 
(3.15) is equivalent to finding a global minimum for the unconstrained minimization 
problem: 
 ( )1minimize  mn no n oX X+ + +∈ℜ Ψ   (3.28) 
In other words, the SCNE model with deterministic demands indeed has an 
unconstrained minimization formulation defined in eqn. (3.28). Using the same 
arguments, the SCNE model with random demands is also of the unconstrained 
minimization formulation: 
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 ( )2ˆ ˆminimize  mn nX X+∈ℜ Ψ  (3.29) 
where the merit function ( )2 XΨ  is defined as follows. 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 22 2
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,
m n n
ij ij j j
i j j
X q F X F X
= = =
Ψ = φ + φ ρ∑∑ ∑  (3.30) 
Proposition 3.2.  The conditions in Theorem 2 of Nagurney et al. (2002) can also 
make sure that the unconstrained minimization problem (3.28) at least admits one 
solution.  
Proof.  The conditions in Theorem 2 of Nagurney et al. (2002) illustrate that there 
exists a nonnegative vector mn no n oB + + +∈ℜ  such that the following VI formulation has 
a solution, denoted by BX   , satisfying the condition: 0 BX B≤ <  . 
Find a *0 X B≤ ≤   such that  
 ( )( )* * 0,  0TF X X X X B− ≥ ∀ ≤ ≤       (3.31) 
Since 0 BX B≤ <  , there exists a sufficient small but positive number 1δ   and a 
row vector ( )2 2, , mn no n oY δ δ + + += ∈ℜ "   with element 2 0δ >  such that  
 ( )10 1 BX B≤ + ≤ δ  (3.32) 
 0 BX Y B≤ + ≤    (3.33) 
Let us take three vectors: ( )1 11 BX Xδ= +   , 2 0.5 BX X=    and 3 BX X Y= +   , it 
follows that 1 2 30 , ,X X X B≤ ≤    . Substituting these three vectors into eqn. (3.31) in 
turn and then rearranging the induced inequalities, eqn. (3.34)  can be derived as 
 ( )( ) 0TB BF X X =     (3.34) 
 ( ) 0BF X ≥   (3.35) 
Thus, it can be seen that BX    fulfills ( )1 0BXΨ =  according to eqn. (3.26). In 
other words, BX   is a global minimum for the unconstrained minimization problem 
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(3.28).  
Similarly, it can be demonstrated that the conditions in Theorem 3 of Dong et al. 
(2004) can also guarantee the existence of a global minimum for the unconstrained 
minimization formulation (3.29). It should be pointed out that seeking a global 
minimum for an unconstrained minimization problem is not easy because the 
minimization problem can have stationary points which are not global solutions. 
Fortunately, Theorem 3.5 of Geiger and Kanzow  (1996) can yield: 
Proposition 3.3. If function ( )F X  and ( )ˆ ˆF X are monotone and continuously 
differentiable, then any stationary point of the unconstrained minimization problems 
(3.28) and (3.29) are their respective global minimums.  
Proposition 3.3 provides the confidence to implement an efficient algorithm for 
the unconstrained minimization problems for solving the SCNE models.   
3.4 Quasi-Newton Algorithm vs. the Modified Projection Method  
Quasi-Newton algorithm is one of the most efficient methods for solving the 
unconstrained minimization problems. It mainly consists of two components: 
updating an approximation of the inverse matrix of Hessian matrix of the objective 
function and performing a line search. More precisely, the genetic iterative schemes of 
quasi-Newton algorithm for the unconstrained minimization problems (3.28) and 
(3.29) can be presented as follows. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1N N NN NX X D X+ = − ∇Ψ   α  (3.36) 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1( ) 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆN NN N NX X D X+ += − ∇Ψα  (3.37) 
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where N  is the number of iterations; ND  and ˆ ND  are the approximations of inverse 
matrices of Hessian matrices, respectively; Nα  and ˆNα  are the step sizes.  
In reality, there are a few successful schemes such as the well-known BFGS 
method that can update matrices ND  and ˆ ND  efficiently. The step sizes in eqns. (3.36) 
and (3.37) can be estimated by implementing a line search procedure. Here, the 
detailed description and the numerical examples of quasi-Newton method are not 
presented. Interesting reader can refer to Bazaraa et al. (1993) for details.  
A projection method for solving a VI is akin to a gradient project method for 
solving a nonlinear programming problem to some extent. It aims at generating the 
iterative points closer and closer to a solution for a VI. Nagurney et al. (2002) and 
Dong et al. (2004) adopted the modified projection method to solve their respective 
VI formulations for the SCNE models. The iterative schemes of the modified 
projection method for VIs (3.7) and (3.14) can be stated as follows. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )1 mn no n o mn no n oN N N NX P X F P X F Xα α+ + + + + ++ ++ ℜ ℜ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦        (3.38) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆmn n mn nN N N NX P X F P X F Xα α+ ++ ++ ℜ ℜ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (3.39) 
where α  and αˆ  are two predetermined parameters called step sizes, and [ ]P YΩ  is the 
orthogonal projection of vector Y  on the set Ω  with respect to Euclidean norm, 
namely: 
 ( ) arg min
X
P Y X YΩ ∈Ω= −  (3.40) 
where X Y−  denotes the Euclidean norm of vector X Y− . 
In the case of mn no n o+ + ++Ω =ℜ  or mn n++Ω =ℜ , the projection operation (3.40) can be 
implemented easily. However, a universal step size guaranteeing the convergence of 
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the modified projection method does not exist since it relies on the unknown Lipschitz 
constant of the vector function entering a VI. In other words, when implementing the 
modified projection method for a SCNE model, it is a challenging issue to obtain a 
desirable step size. Conversely, the quasi-Newton algorithm does not have such a 
limitation as a line search procedure is able to figure out the step size. Although 
performing a line search will use additional computational time, the super-linearly 
convergence property of the quasi-Newton algorithm may remedy it. 
3.5 Numerical Examples  
Up to now, this chapter has derived two unconstrained minimization formulations  
(3.28) and (3.29) for the SCNE models. Compared to the modified projection method, 
it has qualitatively shown that the quasi-Newton algorithm is more suitable to solve 
the SCNE models based the unconstrained minimization formulations. To evaluate the 
performances of these two solution methods, benchmark examples are essential. To do 
so, eleven examples for the SCNE models will be employed. The first benchmark 
example that will be constructed is a variation of Example 1 in Nagurney et al. (2002). 
The other ten examples those will be utilized are the same as that given by Nagurney 
et al. (2002) and Dong et al. (2004).  
To compare the two solution methods fairly, the same initial solutions and the 
same stopping criterion in them for these eleven examples are adopted, which are 
shown as follows. 
Five benchmark examples with deterministic demands: 
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 ( )(0)Initial solution: 10,10, ,10 mn no n oX + + += ∈ℜ "  (3.41) 
 ( ) ( )1Stopping criterion: 0.0001N NX X+ − ≤   (3.42) 
Six benchmark examples with random demands: 
 ( )(0)ˆInitial solution: 10,10, ,10 mn nX += ∈ℜ"  (3.43) 
 ( ) ( )1ˆ ˆStopping criterion: 0.0001N NX X+ − ≤  (3.44) 
The modified projection method is programmed using Matlab version 6.0, and the 
quasi-Newton algorithm in the optimization tool box of the Matlab is invoked directly. 
These two solution methods are run on a personal computer with the CPU of Intel 
Pentium IV 1.6GMHZ and RAM of 256M.  
3.5.1 A modified example  
Let us consult Example 1 for the SCNE model with deterministic demands, given 
by Nagurney et al. (2002). Based on this example, a new numerical example is 
constructed as follows. It keeps all data in the original example except for the 
production cost functions, which now take the new expressions: 
 31 1 1 2( )f q q q q= +  (3.45) 
 32 2 1 2( )f q q q q= +  (3.46) 
Applying the quasi-Newton algorithm for the relevant constrained minimization 
model (3.28) with respect to the modified example yields the solution: 
( )* 1* 2* * *3, , ,X Q Q= γ ρ  with individual components: ( )1* 2* 4.54, 4.54, 4.54, 4.54Q Q= =  , 
( )* 273.58, 273.58γ =  and ( )*3 283.12,283.12ρ =  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the change of value of the merit function within the last 
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fifteen iterations of the quasi-Newton algorithm in solving the modified example. It 
clearly indicates that the value of the merit function at the iterative point is almost 
equal to zero after 61 iterations. In other words, the above solution *X  is indeed the 






























Figure 3.3 Change of value of merit function with respect to the number of iterations 
for the modified example 
 
Since the second-order derivatives for production cost functions (3.45) and (3.46) 
are unbounded, Lipschitz continuity condition for the vector function ( )F X   
associated with this example does not hold.  It thus means that the modified projection 
method may not be convergent for the example according to Theorem 4 of Nagurney 
et al. (2002). However, by trial and error on step size α  in iterative scheme (3.38), it 
is found that find that when step size α  in the effective interval (0, 0.005] the 
modified projection method is workable. Figure 3.4 evidences the convergent trend of 
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the modified projection method with three different predetermined step sizes for the 
example. It can be seen that the modified projection method is divergent in the case of 
that step size 0.01α = . In addition, the modified projection method will reach the 
stopping criterion (3.42) after 2315 iterations when step size 0.005α = , but it will 
terminate after 9820 iterations when step size 0.001α = . Hence, the performance of 
the modified projection method heavily depends on the value of the predetermined 
step size. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to seek an appropriate step size for a 




































Step size =0.01 Step size = 0.005
Step size =0.001
 
Figure 3.4 The convergent performance of the modified projection method 
 
In terms of CPU times used by these two solution methods for the modified 
example, the quasi-Newton algorithm has spent 0.37 seconds, and the modified 
projection method with step size ˆ 0.05α =  has used 0.73 seconds. While both of these 
two numbers are acceptable in finding a solution, they explicitly imply that 
performance of the quasi-Newton method for this example is better than that of the 
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modified projection method. 
3.5.2 The other ten examples 
Nagurney et al. (2002) provided four examples about the supply network 
equilibrium model with deterministic demands, and Dong et al. (2004) gave six 
examples for the supply network equilibrium model with random demands. They 
merely employed these ten examples to verify that the modified projection method is 
capable of solving their variational inequality formulations (3.7) and (3.14). The 
predetermined step sizes guaranteeing the convergence of the modified projection 
method expressed in eqns. (3.38)-(3.39) for these ten examples do theoretically exist. 
However, there is no practical guide to obtain these step sizes. By trial and error, an 
effective interval of the step size for each example can be estimated, which is 
tabulated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.  According to these two tables, it can be 
seen that the effective interval of the step size is varied over the ten examples.  
With regard to these ten examples, both the quasi-Newton algorithm and the 
modified projection method with a step size in the corresponding effective interval 
shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 can generate the same solution. The CPU times they used 
for each example, however, are quite different. They can be compared by calculating 
ratio of the CPU time used by the quasi-Newton algorithm to the least CPU time used 
by the modified projection method, which are obtained by enumerating all possible 
effective step sizes. These ratios are listed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. From these two 
tables, it can be seen that there are 6 cases out of the ten examples, among which the 
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performance of the quasi-Newton algorithm is better than the modified projection 
method. If the predetermined step size in the modified projection method is equal to 
0.01, the number of examples for which the CPU time used by the quasi-Newton is 
less than that used by the modified projection method will rise to 8.  
 
Table 3.1 Effective intervals of step size α  for the four examples in Nagurney et al. 
(2002) 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
(0, 0.06]  (0, 0.06] (0, 0.04] (0, 0.06] 
 
Table 3.2 Effective intervals of step size αˆ  for the six examples in Dong et al. (2004) 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5 Example 6 
(0, 0.01] (0, 0.02] (0, 0.03] (0, 0.03] (0, 0.03] (0, 0.02] 
 
Table 3.3 Ratios of CPU time in seconds used by the quasi-Newton algorithm to the 
least CPU time used by the modified projection method for the four examples of 
Nagurney et al. (2004) 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
11.90 2.16 62.36 4.38 
 
Table 3.4 Ratios of CPU time in seconds used by the quasi-Newton algorithm to the 
least CPU time used by the modified projection method for the six examples of Dong 
et al. (2004) 
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5 Example 6 
0.01 0.16 0.23 0.54 0.51 0.17 
3.6 Discussion and Summary 
This chapter has developed the unconstrained minimization formulation for the 
SCNE model with two cases: deterministic demands and random demands. It further 
shows that any stationary solution of the unconstrained minimization model derived is 
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indeed the solution for the relevant SCNE model. In view of the difficulty that 
implementing the modified projection method must take an appropriate step size in 
advance, the well-known quasi-Newton algorithm is applied for solving the SCNE 
models. Numerical results from the benchmark examples not only reveal the 
limitation of the modified projection method but also confirm the advantage and 
flexibility of the quasi-Newton algorithm. Hence, this chapter has successfully 
provided the alternative formulation and solution method for the SCNE models. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the idea of transferring VI formulations to 
unconstrained minimization problems can be not only used for the two SCNE models 
stated in this chapter, but also for all of the other SCNE models (Nagurney and 
Toyasaki, 2003, Nagurney and Toyasaki,2003, Nagurney and Toyasaki, 2005, Dong et 
al., 2005 and Nagurney and Matsypura, 2005) and even the other VI formulations 
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CHAPTER 4 COMPETITIVE FACILITY LOCATION ON 
DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAINS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is focused on a competitive facility location problem. When a firm 
locates a new manufacturing facility, and begins producing and shipping products to 
demand markets, it typically stimulates certain reactions in markets. For example, the 
introduction of a new facility increases the overall capacity of an industry, and hence 
can perturb the established economic equilibrium status of supplies, demands and 
product flows, which is actually a long-term steady market state due to competition. 
The introduction of this new capacity, and in the case of an “entering” firm, the 
introduction of an entirely new competitor on the market, will trigger some form of 
competitive response from existing firms in the industry. This would suggest that to 
truly make a profit maximizing location decision, the firm must anticipate the 
market’s reaction to a potential location decision, in its actual location decision-
making process. It is this need to anticipate the market’s reaction that motivates the 
authors’ objective to develop facility location models that somehow include projected 
market reactions endogenously within the firm’s profit maximizing facility location 
objective function. 
In this chapter, a SCNE model with production capacity constraints, which is an 
extension of the SCNE model developed by Nagurney et al. (2002), is proposed firstly. 
After successfully deriving the SCNE model with production capacity constraints, this 
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chapter proceeds to build an MPEC model for a competitive facility location problem 
on decentralized supply chains. The proposed MPEC model involves binary (0-1) 
decision variables representing whether or not a candidate site is chosen and the 
parameterized VI constraint that formulates the SCNE  model with the production 
capacity constraints in the case of a given feasible facility location solution. 
4.2 Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Production Capacity Constraints 
and Solution Method 
For convenience, the notations and equations for the supply chain network 
equilibrium model introduced in Chapter 3 are continued to be used in this chapter.  
4.2.1 Supply chain network equilibrium model with production capacity constraints  
Let us consider the deterministic case of the SCNE model introduced in Chapter 3. 
In view of limited resources, such as financial budgets, equipment, space and 
available raw materials, managed or owned by manufacturers in the decentralized 
supply chain, it is more rational and practical to assume that quantities of the product 








q C i m
=
≤ =∑ "  (4.1) 
where iC  is the upper bound of the production level for manufacturer i .  Inequalities 
expressed by  (4.1) are cast as the production capacity constraints of manufacturers in 
this chapter.  
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Having taken the production capacity constraints into consideration, the set of all 
the feasible shipment patterns, i.e., shipment patterns that satisfy the constraints (3.4) 
and (4.1), for the decentralized supply chain can be expressed below.  
( )1 2
1 1 1
, , 1, ,  and , , 1, ,
n o m
mn no
ij i jk ij
j k i
Q Q q C i m q q j n++
= = =
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪Ω = ∈ℜ ≤ = ≤ =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ ∑" "  (4.2) 
It is now ready to derive an SCNE model with production capacity constraints. 
Following the similar derivation in Nagurney et al. (2002), the SCNE  conditions in 
the case of the production capacity constraints can be characterized as: finding a row 
vector ( )1* 2* *3, , oQ Q +ρ ∈Ω×ℜ  such that 
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Existence and uniqueness of the solution of VI (4.3) can be easily proved under 
the same assumptions in the SCNE model without considering the production 
capacity constraints by means of mathematical techniques used in Nagurney et al. 
(2002).  
According to the Lagrangian duality for VIs (Auslender and Teboulle, 2000), 
there are optimal Lagrangian multipliers, *iλ , 1, ,i m= " , and *jγ , 1, ,j n= " , with 
respect to the production capacity constraints (4.1) and the stock capacity constraints 
(3.4), respectively, which defines set Ω  as well, for the solution ( )1* 2* *3, ,Q Q ρ  of the 
above VI. These nonnegative optimal Lagrangian multipliers together with the 
solution of VI (4.3) should fulfill the slackness complementary conditions: 








q C i m
=
⎛ ⎞λ − = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ "  (4.4) 
As such, the equilibrium price charged by a manufacturer for a retailer can be 
evaluated by  
 
( ) ( )1* ** *




f Q c q
i m j n
q q
∂ ∂ρ = + + λ = =∂ ∂ " "  (4.5) 
Similarly, the equilibrium unit price of the product charged by a retailer can be 
calculated by 
 * *2 , 1, ,j j j nρ = γ = "  (4.6) 
Eqns. (4.3)-(4.6) indicate that the SCNE model with production capacity 
constraints will be identical to the original SCNE model when the production capacity 
constraints become unbinding, namely, * 0iλ = , 1, ,i m= " .  Because the set of 
feasible solutions for VI (4.3) , o+Ω×ℜ , is a proper subset of the nonnegative orchant, 
the modified projection method suggested by Nagurney et al. (2002) is no longer 
available for solving VI (4.3). Thus, it urges us to seek an efficient and effective 
solution method for solving the SCNE model with production capacity constraints. 
Besides, the solution method is able to find the relevant optimal Lagrangian 
multipliers.  
4.2.2 Logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction-correction method  
In the context of optimization, the classical proximal method replaces a 
minimization problem by a sequence of better behaved problems with a quadratic 
regularization term added to the objective function (Rockafellar, 1976). Many 
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generalizations of this classical proximal method have been proposed recently after 
the success of interior point methods for linear programming. One of the main 
objectives is to replace the squared Euclidean norm by coercive regularizations that 
are able to implicitly deal with simple constraints such as box and linear constraints, 
giving raise to interior proximal methods (e.g., Auslender and Haddou, 1995; Teboulle, 
1997).  
Auslender et al. (1999) developed a logarithmic-quadratic proximal (LQP) 
method for monotone VIs defined on polyhedral sets, which is an interior proximal 
method with the global convergent property. However, the LQP method is merely an 
iterative solution framework without a tractable procedure in calculating an iterative 
point that is a solution of the inclusion equations generated at each iteration. He et al. 
(2006) successfully tackled such a flaw, and they created a notable LQP P-C method 
that includes the prediction and correction procedures to effectively solving the 
inclusion equations induced in LQP. Besides, the LQP P-C method can also attain the 
optimal Lagrangian multipliers. It thus fits all the requirements of a solution method 
for the SCNE model with the production capacity constraints. To customize the LQP 
P-C method for the SCNE model with the production capacity constraints, the LQP P-
C method is elaborated below.  
For the sake of presentation, VI (4.3) can be rewritten by vector notations as 
follows. 
Find a row vector ( )1* 2* *3, , oQ Q +ρ ∈Ω×ℜ  such that 
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( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1* 1 1* 2* * 2 2*
1 2 3
2* * * 1 2
3 3 3 3 3
,
, 0, , ,
T T
T o
F Q Q Q F Q Q Q
F Q Q Q +
− + ρ −
+ ρ ρ −ρ ≥ ∀ ρ ∈Ω×ℜ
 (4.7) 
where the row vector functions:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
1 , , , 
where 1, , , 1, ,
i jij ij mn
ij ij ij
f Q c Qc q
F Q
q q q
i m j n





 ( ) ( )( )2 22 3 3, , , ,  where 1, , , 1, ,nojk kF Q c Q j n k oρ = −ρ ∈ℜ = =" " " "  (4.9) 
 ( ) ( )23 3 3
1





F Q q d k o
=
⎛ ⎞ρ = − ρ ∈ℜ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑" " "  (4.10) 
In terms of vector notations, production capacity constraints (4.1) of the 
manufacturers and stock constraints (3.4) of retailers can be concisely rewritten as 
 1 1Q A C≤  (4.11) 
 2 12 3Q A Q A≤  (4.12) 





1 2 3, and 
m mn n






I J ×× ×
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= = = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
" "
" " ## % # # % #
" "
 (4.13) 
where column vectors: ( )1 1,1, 1 T mmI I= = = ∈ℜ" " ,  ( )1 1,1, 1 T nnJ J= = = ∈ℜ" " , 
and all the iE , 1, ,i m= " , are identical to a n n×  dimensional unit matrix . 
Let ∞⋅  and ⋅  denote the infinity- and 2-norms of a vector, respectively. The 
LQP P-C method for solving VI (4.3) is elaborated below.  
LQP P-C method 
Step 0. (Initialization) Let parameters  0 1β = , 1( 0)v = > , 0.9( 1)η = < , 0.1µ = , 
2.0 1σ = > , an initial solution, ( ) ( )( )2 0 01(0) 3, , mn no oQ Q ++ +ρ ∈ℜ ×ℜ , and initial 
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Lagrangian multipliers, (0) m+λ ∈ℜ , ( )0 n+γ ∈ℜ . Set the number of iteration 0τ = .  
Step 1. (Stopping criterion) If ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3, , , ,e Q Qτ τ τ τ τ ∞ρ λ γ ≤ ε , in which ε  is a 
predetermined tolerance, then stop; otherwise, continue; where vector  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3, , , , mn nk o m ne Q Qτ τ τ τ τ + + + +ρ λ γ ∈ℜ  defined as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








3 3 3 3 1
2 1
1 3







Q Q F Q A A
Q Q F Q A
F Q Q A C
Q A Q A
τ τ τ τ τ
+τ τ τ τ τ
+τ τ τ τ τ
+τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
+τ τ τ τ
ρ λ γ =
⎛ ⎡ ⎤− − + λ − γ⎜ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝
⎡ ⎤− − ρ + γ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ρ − ρ − ρ λ − λ + −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎞⎡ ⎤γ − γ + − ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎠
 (4.14) 
where [ ]y +  is the projection operator of vector y onto the nonnegative orthant. 
Namely, assuming that ( )1, , NNy y y= ∈ℜ" , a vector of N-dimensional real 
space, then [ ] ( )1 , , NNy y y+ + + += ∈ℜ"  with elements: 
 








"  (4.15) 
Step 2. (Prediction step) Produce a predictor, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , ,Q Qτ τ τ τ τρ λ γ , that well 
approximates a solution of the inclusion equations, by executing the efficient 
manipulations: 
 Step 2.1. Choose a predictor in light of step size τβ  as follows. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1ˆ ˆ k Q A C +τ τ τβ⎡ ⎤λ = λ + −⎢ ⎥ν⎣ ⎦  (4.16) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 12 3ˆ ˆ k Q A Q A +τ τ τ τβ⎡ ⎤γ = γ + −⎢ ⎥ν⎣ ⎦  (4.17) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )22ˆ 4 / 2, 1, , , 1, ,ij ij ij ijq s s q i m j nτ τ⎛ ⎞= + + µ = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ " "  (4.18) 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )22ˆ 4 / 2, 1, , , 1, ,jk jk jk jkq s s q j n k oτ τ⎛ ⎞= + + µ = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ " "  (4.19) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )223 3ˆ 4 / 2k k k kt tτ τ⎛ ⎞ρ = + + µ ρ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (4.20) 
where ijs , 1, ,i m= " , 1, ,j n= " , jks , 1, ,j n= " , 1, ,k o= "  and kt , 
1, ,k o= "  are the elements of the following three vectors: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 1 3ˆ ˆ, 1 T T mnijs Q F Q A Aτ τ τ ττ= −µ −β + λ − γ ∈ℜ" "  (4.21) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 22 3 2ˆ, 1 , T nkjks Q F Q Aτ τ τ ττ= −µ −β ρ + γ ∈ℜ" "  (4.22) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )23 3 3, , 1 , okt F Qτ τ ττ= −µ ρ −β ρ ∈ℜ" "  (4.23) 
Step 2.2. Seek a step size, τβ , fulfilling a certain condition 
Let us calculate 
 
( ) ( ) ( )










ν ξ + +µ ξ=
ν −µ π + ν −µ π
 (4.24) 
 where vectors ( )1 mn nk oτ + +ξ ∈ℜ , ( )2 m nτ +ξ ∈ℜ , ( )1 mn nk oτ + +π ∈ℜ  and 
( )
2
m nτ +π ∈ℜ  with 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3
1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , ,
            , , , ,
F Q F Q F Q
F Q F Q F Q
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ τ τ
⎡ξ = β ρ ρ −⎢⎣
⎤ρ ρ ⎥⎦
 (4.25) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 1 12 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ,Q Q A Q Q A Q Q Aτ τ τ τ τ τ ττ ⎡ ⎤ξ = β − − − −⎣ ⎦  (4.26) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 21 3 3ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,Q Q Q Qτ τ τ τ τ τ τπ = ρ − ρ  (4.27) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 ˆ ˆ, ,τ τ τ τ τπ = λ γ − λ γ  (4.28) 
If rτ > η , then reduce τβ  by setting 0.8 / krτ τβ = β × , and go to Step 
2.1. Otherwise, go to Step 3.  
Step 3. (Adjust step size τβ   and parameter ν  for the next iteration if necessary). 
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Enlarge τβ  for the next iteration if rτ  is small enough by  
 1
0.7 / ,  if 0.5
,otherwise
r rτ τ τ
τ+
τ
β × ≤⎧β = ⎨β⎩
 (4.29) 
 Reduce or increase parameter ν  according to the formula: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
0.5 ,if / 1+ 4 /  




⎧ ν ξ µ > ξ ν⎪⎪ν = ν ξ µ < ξ ν⎨⎪ν⎪⎩
 (4.30) 
Step 4. (Calculate the step size of the correction step). Set the step size,  
 * 1
1τ τ τ
⎛ ⎞−µα = σα β ⎜ ⎟+µ⎝ ⎠  (4.31) 
 where  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 2 2 2*
1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2/ 1 1 /
T T
TT
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ+ τ τ+ τ τ τ τ τ
π π + ξ + π νπ + ξα = ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤π + ξ +µ +µ π + ξ + π + ξ ν νπ + ξ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (4.32) 
Step 5. (Correction step) Calculate the new iterative solution, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 1 1 1 13, , , ,Q Qτ+ τ+ τ+ τ+ τ+ρ λ γ , by performing the operations: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1Qˆ A C +τ+ τ ττα⎡ ⎤λ = λ + −⎢ ⎥ν⎣ ⎦  (4.33) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 21 3Q A Q A +τ+ τ τ ττα⎡ ⎤γ = γ + −⎢ ⎥ν⎣ ⎦   (4.34) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )221 ˆ ˆ 4 / 2, 1, , , 1, ,ij ij ij ijq s s q i m j nτ+ τ⎛ ⎞= + + µ = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ " "  (4.35) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )221 ˆ ˆ 4 / 2, 1, , , 1, ,jk jk jk jkq s s q j n k oτ+ τ⎛ ⎞= + + µ = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ " "  (4.36) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2213 3ˆ ˆ 4 / 2k k k kt tτ+ τ⎛ ⎞ρ = + + µ ρ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (4.37) 
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where iˆjs , 1, ,i m= " , 1, ,j n= " , ˆ jks , 1, ,j n= " , 1, ,k o= "  and kˆt , 
1, ,k o= "  are the elements of the three vectors as follows. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 1 3ˆ ˆ ˆˆ, 1 T T mnijs Q F Q A Aτ τ τ ττ= −µ −α + λ − γ ∈ℜ" "  (4.38) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 22 3 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ, 1 , T nkjks Q F Q Aτ τ τ ττ= −µ −α ρ + γ ∈ℜ" "  (4.39) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )23 3 3ˆˆ ˆ, , 1 , okt F Qτ τ ττ= −µ ρ −α ρ ∈ℜ" "  (4.40) 
 Let 1τ = τ+ , and go to Step 1. 
It has already been recognized that ( )1* 2* * * *3, , , ,Q Q ρ λ γ  is the solution of VI (4.3) 
if and only if  ( )1* 2* * * *3, , , , 0e Q Q ∞ρ λ γ =  (He et al, 2004 or 2006). Hence, the 
stopping criterion in Step 1 adopted by the LQP P-C method is rational. He et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that the procedure comprising Steps 2.1 and 2.2 to obtain an 
appropriate step size τβ   will be terminated after limited iterations. They further 
rigorously proved the convergence of the LQP P-C method for any monotone VI 
defined on a polyhedral set.  
With respect to the LQP P-C method, the computational burden of manipulations 
shown in eqns. (4.16)-(4.40) is very tiny because it merely needs to perform 
fundamental mathematical operations such as comparisons, additions, multiplications 
and square-root. Other than that, Step 3 that aims to automatically adjust the step size 
and the algorithmic parameter according to changes of some merit indices will make 
the method more effective and robust.   
Finally, it should be pointed out that this idea and solution method of SCNE 
model with capacity constraints can also be used in other SCNE models except for the 
SCNE model developed by Nagurney and her colleagues in 2002.  
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4.3 MPEC Model for Competitive Facility Location Problem 
The competitive facility location problem on a decentralized supply chain is a 
strategic level decision problem of a firm. It is to maximize an objective such as the 
firm’s profit through determining locations of its facilities as well as the production 
levels of these facilities, taking into account the market competition existing in the 
decentralized supply chain which can be captured by the SCNE model with 
production capacity constraints.  
Suppose that there are m  manufacturers, n  retailers and o  demand markets for 
an existing decentralized supply chain. All of these manufacturers produce 
substitutable products and supply them to the demand markets via the retailers. Let L  
be the number of candidate sites where the entering firm’s facilities can be built, and 
they are numbered by 1, 2, , L" , respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that the newly 
built facilities are treated as additional manufacturers joining the existing 
decentralized supply chain, and consequently competition arises among these new 
manufacturers as well as the existing manufacturers. It is further assumed that the 
entering firm is able to predict SCNE shipment and prices patterns between the 
manufacturers and the retailers after the new facilities joining the decentralized supply 
chain. Note that the latter assumption is available for the situation in which the 
existing market is made up of a large number of small firms; by contrast, the entering 
firm is a large one with the ability to influence market prices (Miller et al., 1992). It 
should be pointed out that these two assumptions were made by Tobin and Friesz 
(1986) on studying the competitive facility location problem with the SPE constraints.  
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Let lx  be the binary decision variable to represent whether or not location l  will 
be selected by the entering firm, namely: 
 
1,   a facility is built at site 
,  1, ,
0,  otherwisel
l
x l L⎧= =⎨⎩ "
 (4.41) 
Let lC  be the production capacity of the facility located at candidate site l  
( 1, 2...l L= ). The entering firm’s objective should be a function of the SCNE shipment 
and prices patterns between manufacturer and retailers of the decentralized supply 
chain involving the new facilities. To distinguish notations of decision variables used 
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, let ( ), ,lx x= " "  be a row vector of all the binary 
decision variable; ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,ijQ x q x= " "   and ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,ijx xρ = ρ " "  be the row 
vectors of all the SCNE shipments and prices between manufacturers, ( )i M x∈ , and 
retailers, 1, ,j n= " , where ( )M x  is set of all manufacturers associated with a 
decision variable x, namely 
 ( ) { } { }1, 1, , 1, ,lM x l x l L L L m= = = + +" ∪ "  (4.42) 
In addition, let ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,h x Q x xρ   denote the generic objective function concerned in 
the competitive facility location problem. 
The competitive facility location problem sometimes has to consider a few 
constraints such as a limited investment budget. Without loss of generality, it is 
assumed that there are  P  constraints denoted by functions, ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,pg x Q x xρ  , 
1, 2, ,p P= " . Obviously, 0P =  means that there is no constraint. Therefore, the 
competitive facility location problem with the SCNE constraints can be formulated by 
the MPEC model: 
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 ( ) ( )( )1 1max , ,x h x Q x xρ   (4.43) 
subject to 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1, , 0, 1, ,pg x Q x x p Pρ ≤ =  "  (4.44) 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )











,   , ,
n i jij ij
ij ij
i M x j ij ij ij
n o
jk k jk jk
j k
o n
jk k k k
k j
o
f Q x c Q xc q x
q q x
q q q
c Q x x q q x
q x d x x





⎡ ⎤∂ ∂∂⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+ + × − +⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−ρ × − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− ρ × ρ −ρ ≥⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦






 0 or 1   1, ,lx l L= = "  (4.46) 
 where ( )xΩ , the set of all feasible shipment patterns for the decentralized supply 
chain involving the new built facilities , can be expressed by 




, , , , 1, ,x
n o
m n no
ij i jk ij
j k i M x
x Q Q q C i M x q q j n++
= = ∈
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪Ω = ∈ℜ ≤ ∈ ≤ =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ ∑ " (4.47) 
where xm  is the cardinality of set ( )M x  defined by eqn. (4.42). Note that 
( ) ( )( )1 1..., ,...ijx xρ = ρ  , which is a row vector of ( )1ij xρ , involved in eqns. (4.43)-
(4.44) has the following analytical expressions according to eqn. (4.5). 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )11 , , 1, ,i ij ijij i
ij ij
f Q x c q x
x x i M x j n
q q
∂ ∂ρ = + + λ ∈ =∂ ∂
  "  (4.48) 
where ( )i xλ , ( )i M x∈ , is the optimal Lagrangian multiplier of the parameterized VI 
(4.45).  
It can be seen that the above MPEC model is an integer programming-like 
optimization problem. However, its constraints include VI (4.45) that describes the 
SCNE conditions with the production capacity constraints associated with the 
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decision variable x. Note that the MPEC model (4.43)-(4.46) is more generic. It can 
be customized by specifying the objective function (4.43) and constraints (4.44) 
according to different requirements in a competitive facility location problem. The 
following two instances demonstrate the flexibility of the above MPEC model.  
Instance 1. The profit maximization with budget constraints  
Most facility location problems aim to maximize the profit subject to limited 
budget. Let lF  be the fixed cost of setting up a facility with certain production 
capacity at site l , 1, ,l L= " , and B be the maximum investment budget of the 
entering firm. Hence, the objective function of the preceding MPEC model for the 
competitive facility location problem with budget constraints can be specified below.  







ij lj ij i l l
i M x j l
h x Q x x x q x c Q x f Q x x F
∈ = =
⎡ ⎤ρ = ρ − − −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑    
 (4.49) 
where ( )1M x , the set of facility locations chosen by the entering firm, is defined by 
 ( ) { }1 1, 1, ,lM x l x l L= = = "  (4.50) 
The first term in the right hand side of eqn. (4.49) is the revenue the entering firm can 
gain from the built facilities, and the send term is the total cost of setting up these 








≤∑  (4.51)  
Instance 2. The return ratio maximization  
Maximizing a return ratio such as return on logistics assets (ROLA) is also an 
important objective adopted in facility location decisions (Ballou, 2001). In this case, 
there is no restriction on the entering firm’s budget. However, the objective has 
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become maximization of the return ratio. Hence, the objective function (4.43) of the 
MPEC model has the following analytical expression:  








ij lj ij i




x q x c Q x f Q x









   (4.52) 
4.4 Solution Algorithm  
The preceding competitive facility location problem is an NP-complete problem. 
The well-known branch-and-bound or branch-and-cut algorithm for integer 
programming problems is no longer available for solving the above MPEC model due 
to the parameterized VI (4.45). The method of exhaustive enumeration is able to find 
the optimal solution of the MPEC model. Nonetheless, it can only solve the small-
scale problems due to computer capacity.  Hence, GA as one of the well-recognized 
meta-heuristic method can be adopted for solving the MPEC model.  
GAs start with a population of individuals represented by chromosomes. 
Chromosomes from one population are taken and used to form a new generation of 
population according to their fitness – the more suitable they are, the more chance 
they can be selected to reproduce. Encoding of chromosome and choice of fitness 
function heavily depend on the nature of an optimization problem. With respect to the 
forgoing MPEC model, a chromosome is encoded by the row vector of binary 
decision variables, namely, ( )1, , Lx x x= " . Apart from the parameterized VI (4.45), 
the MPEC model has another group of constraints shown in eqn. (4.44) that leads to 
the computational difficulty for GA to check the feasibility of a chromosome. 
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Fortunately, the penalty function approach arising from the nonlinear programming 
(Bazaraa et al., 1993) can be employed to tackle the problem. In other words, the 
fitness function of the GA is defined by the following function including a penalty 
term related to the constraint (4.44): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 11 1
1




H x h x Q x x g x Q x xρ ω ρ
=
= − ∑    (4.53) 
where ω  is a suitable positive penalty parameter such that the function value of 
( )H x  at any infeasible solution is less than that at any feasible solution. Having 
transformed the constraint (4.44) into the objective function by using a penalty term, 
given the chromosome x , the parameterized VI (4.45) can be solved by the LQP P-C 
method.   
A conventional GA consists of three main steps: selection, crossover and 
mutation. The selection step attends to select chromosomes from the population to be 
parents for crossover. The stronger the chromosomes, i.e., chromosomes with the 
better fitness function values, the higher the probability which will be chosen to be the 
parents to generate a new chromosome. Note that there are a few schemes, including 
roulette wheel selection (Golberg, 1989), rank selection (Grefenstette and Baker, 
1989), Boltzman selection (Goldberg, 1990) and tournament selection (Goldberg and 
Deb, 1991), to select the better chromosomes. The crossover step is the process of 
combining the genes of a selected chromosome with those of another to create 
offspring that inherit traits of both parents. As the binary encoding scheme of a 
chromosome is chosen in this study, several crossover methods such as single point 
crossover, two point crossover over, uniform crossover and arithmetic crossover can 
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be used. The mutation step is a gene operator used to maintain genetic diversity from 
one generation of a population of chromosome to the next. It is analogous to 
biological mutation.  
Compared to the classical GA, the LQP P-C method is necessitated when 
evaluating the fitness function (4.53) for a given chromosome. The GA incorporating 
the LQP P-C method for solving the MPEC is called the hybrid GA-LQP P-C, which 
is stated below.  
Hybrid GA-LQP P-C  
Step 0. (Initialization) Randomly generate a population of N chromosomes. 
Step 1. (Calculation of the fitness function) For each chromosome x in the population, 
the value of fitness function F(x) defined by eqn. (4.53) is evaluated after 
implementing the LQP-PC method for the parameterized VI  (4.45) 
associated with the chromosome.  
Step 2. (Generation of a new temporary population). Repeat the following three sub-
steps until the new population is completed. 
Step 2.1. (Selection) According to the fitness function values evaluated in 
Step 1, use the roulette wheel selection method to choose two parent 
chromosomes from the population. 
Step 2.2. (Crossover) With a crossover probability, denoted by crr , cross over 
the parents to form a new offspring according to the one point 
crossover method. If no crossover is performed, offsprings are the 
exact copy of the parents 
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Step 2.3. (Mutation) Generate a number from [0,1] for each gene of the new 
offspring. If this number is less than the mutation probability, 
denoted by mur , change the value of this gene from 0 to 1 or vice 
versa.  
Step 3. Select the best N  chromosomes from the new temporary population and the 
last population, which forms the new population for the next generation.  
Step 4. (Stopping criterion). If a stopping criterion is fulfilled, then terminate, and 
output the best solution from the population. Otherwise, go to Step 1.  
For the above hybrid GA, Step 3 is an elitism strategy (Eshelman, 1991) by 
copying the strongest N  chromosomes from the new temporary population and the 
old population to generate a new generation. This guarantees monotonic non-
degradation of the best solution from an old population to a new population. There are 
two termination criteria that can be adopted in Step 4. It can be terminated when it 
achieves maximum number of generations specified or if there is no improvement in 
the fitness function value of the strongest chromosome in the population for more 
than the number of generations specified. Note that the performance of the hybrid 
GA-LQP P-C may depend on the population size and crossover and mutation 
probabilities.  
4.5 Numerical Examples 
To demonstrate the preceding models and solution methods, this chapter proceeds 
to carry out three numerical examples. The first one intends to numerically show a 
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distinction between the SCNE models with and without the production capacity 
constraints, and to exhibit strength of the LQP P-C method. The second and third 
examples target at the MPEC model of the competitive facility location problem and 
the hybrid GA incorporated with the LQP P-C method.  
4.5.1 An example for supply chain network equilibrium model with the production 
capacity constraints 
Example 4 of Nagurney et al. (2002) is here taken as our numerical example, and 
it is further assumed that each manufacturer has the production capacity tabulated in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Production capacity of each Manufacturer 
Manufacturer ( i ) 1 2 3 
Production Capacity ( iC ) 20 30 100 
 
Referring to the LQP P-C method, the number of iterations required in the 
prediction step and the step size adjustment scheme of the correction step heavily 
depend on parameters η  and σ , respectively. Figure 4.1 shows performance of the 
LQP P-C method with three different groups of values of parameters η  and σ  after 
20 iterations when solving the numerical example for the SCNE with the production 
capacity constraints.  
 




































γ 0.85, 1.5η = σ = 0.90, 2.0η = σ =
0.95, 2.5η = σ =
τ
 
Figure 4.1 The convergent performance of the LQP P-C method with different 
parameters 
 
Note that values of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3, , , ,e Q Qτ τ τ τ τ ∞ρ λ γ  within twenty iterations are not 
presented here due to their sharp changes in terms of magnitude. This figure confirms 
the global convergent property of the LQP P-C method for different parameters 
because ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3, , , ,e Q Qτ τ τ τ τ ∞ρ λ γ  approaches zero with the increasing number of 
iterations.  
 Implementing the LQP P-C method for the example yields the solutions of the 
SCNE model with and without the production capacity constraints, including the 
optimal Lagrangian multipliers, which are listed in Table 4.2. According to Table 4.2, 
it can be observed that the production capacity constraint, * *11 12 20q q+ ≤ , makes the 
solution *11q  and 
*
12q  of the SCNE model and SCNE with production capacity 
constraints different. This suggests that the production capacity constraints do affect 
the decisions of the manufacturers and the equilibrium state of the supply chain.  
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Table 4.2 Solutions of the supply chain network equilibrium models with and without 
production capacity constraints 
Solution With capacity constraints Without capacity 
constraints 
Shipments between 
Manufacturers and Retailers 
* *
11 12 10.000q q= =  
* *
21 22 13.077q q= =  
* *
31 32 50.000q q= =  
* *
11 12 12.395q q= =  
* *
21 22 12.395q q= =  
* *
31 32 50.078q q= =  
Shipments between Retailers 
and Demand markets 
* *
11 12 24.359q q= =  
* *
21 22 24.359q q= =  
* *
31 32 24.359q q= =  
* *
11 12 24.956q q= =  
* *
21 22 24.956q q= =  
* *
31 32 24.956q q= =  
Optimal Lagrangian multipliers 
with respect to the production 
capacity constraints 
*
1 27.7015λ =  
*
2 0λ =   
*
3 5.3574λ =  
 
N.A. 
Optimal Lagrangian multipliers 
with respect to the stock 
capacity constraints 
*
1 242.435γ =  
*
2 242.435γ =  
*
1 241.496γ =  
*
2 241.496γ =  
Prices consumers at different 
demand makers are willing to 
pay   
* * *
31 32 33 271.794ρ = ρ = ρ =
 
* * *
31 32 33 271.454ρ = ρ = ρ =
 
4.5.2 An example for analyzing impact of the production capacity and budget in the 
MPEC model 
The competitive facility location problem adopted here belongs to the preceding 
instance 1, i.e., it wishes to maximize the profit subject to the budget constraint. It is 
assumed that the existing decentralized supply chain consists of  5 manufacturers, 10 
retailers and 10 demand markets, and that there are 10 candidate facility locations 
from which the entering firm can choose, namely, 5m = , 10n = , 10o =  and 10L = .  
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The data for this example is constructed for easy interpretation purposes. Table 
4.3 gives the fixed setting up cost and two sets of production capacities of a facility 
that will be built at a candidate location. It is also assumed that the available budget of 
the entering firm is 200.0, i.e., 200.0B = . 
Following the production functions used in the numerical examples by Nagurney 
et al. (2002) and Dong et al. (2004), the production cost functions for the 
manufacturers including the new joining ones are assumed to have the form:  
 ( ) 210 101
1 1
0.0005 , 1, ,15i ij ij
j j
f Q q i q i
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ "  (4.54) 
The transaction cost functions between manufacturers and retailers, and the handling 
cost functions of the retailers are defined below. 
 ( ) ( )1 22 , 1, ,15, 1, ,10ij ij ijc Q q i j q i j= + + = =" "  (4.55) 
 ( ) 2151
1
2 , 1, ,10j ij
i
c Q q j
=
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ "  (4.56) 
The transaction cost functions between the retailers and the demand markets have the 
expressions: 
 ( )2 5, 1, ,10, 1, ,10jk jkc Q q j k= + = =" "  (4.57) 
The demand functions at the demand markets take the form: 
 ( ) 153 3 3
1
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First set of 
production capacities
Second set of 
production capacities
Setting up  cost 
1 20 13 55 
2 18 12 52 
3 18.4 18.4 57 
4 25 16 58 
5 16.6 25 50 
6 18.5 18.8 52 
7 16 22 56 
8 17 17 48 
9 20 17.2 55 
10 23 18.8 58 
 
As there are ten candidate locations only, all the solutions of the facility location, 
including infeasible ones, amount to 102 1024= . Therefore, the exhaustive 
enumeration method incorporating with the LQP P-C method can be employed to find 
the optimal solution of the MPEC model of this example. Let values of the parameters 
necessitated in the LQP P-C method be 0.9η = , 2.0σ =  and 810−ε =  (tolerance in 
the stopping criterion). For three production capacity scenarios: two sets of the 
production capacities, shown in Table 4.3, and unlimited production capacities, 
performing the exhaustive enumeration method for the MPEC model of the numerical 
example comes out with the maximal profits and the optimal facility locations, which 
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Table 4.4 Maximal profits and the optimal solutions of the MPEC model with 
different production capacity scenarios  
Scenario Maximal profit Optimal facility locations 
First set of production 
capacities 
1054.189 Location 1,2 and 4 
Second set of production 
capacities 
867.530 Locations 1,3 and 5 
Unlimited production 
capacities 
991.468 Locations 1 and 2 
 
Table 4.4 indicates that the maximal profit subject to the first set of the 
production capacities is higher than that subject to the second set of the production 
capacities. This is because the overall production capacity of the decentralized supply 
chain induced by the first set of the production capacities is greater than that induced 
by the second set of the production capacities. In addition, it is very interesting to see 
that the maximal profit subject to the first set of the production capacities is also 
higher than that without any production capacity constraint (i.e., unlimited production 
capacity). This is because the market competition in the case of limited production 
capacity that will raise the supply prices between manufacturers and retailers.  
With regard to the competitive facility location problem on a decentralized supply 
chain, the maximal profit and total expenditure spent by the entering firm in setting up 
manufacturing facilities should vary with the budget. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict 
changes of these two indices with different budgets, respectively, for this numerical 
example. According to these two figures, it can be seen that both the maximal profit 
and the total expenditure become a constant for budget levels greater than 240. In 
other words, more budget may not lead to more profit due to free-market competition. 
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Figure 4.3 Total expenditure vs. budget 
 
4.5.3 Examples for evaluating hybrid GA-LQP P-C method  
Let us first use the above example with the first set of production capacities listed 
in Table 4.3 and budget 200.0B =  to evaluate performance of the hybrid GA-LQP P-
C method for solving the MPEC model because the global optimal solution of the 
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example has already been obtained. In the hybrid GA-LQP P-C method for solving 
this example, let the population size be 500N = , the penalty parameter involved in 
the fitness function expressed by eqn. (4.53) 10.0ω = , and the maximal number of 























0.2, 0.5cr mur r= =
0.3, 0.3cr mur r= =
0.1, 0.7cr mur r= =
 
Figure 4.4 Change of the fitness function values of the small example solved by the 
hybrid GA-LQP P-C method  
 
Figure 4.4 gives the change of the fitness function values obtained by the GA-
LQP P-C method with three different combinations of the crossover and mutation 
probabilities. It fully shows that the hybrid GA-LQP P-C is able to find the optimal 
solution of the MPEC model of the example after ten iterations even if different sets 
of crossover and mutation probabilities are chosen.  
Let us construct a relatively large competitive facility location problem with the 
maximization of profit with a budget constraint, for which the existing decentralized 
supply chain comprises 5 manufacturers, 25 retailers and 25 demand markets, namely, 
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5m = , 25n =  and 25o = . The number of location candidates available to the 
entering firm is assumed to be 20. Production capacities and fixed setting up costs of 
facilities built in these twenty location candidates are listed in Table 4.5. The relevant 
production cost functions, handling cost functions, transaction cost functions and 
elastic demand functions take the same formulae shown by eqns. (4.54)-(4.58). It is 
still assumed that the budget 200.0B = .  
 
Table 4.5 Production capacity and cost of a facility built at a location candidate for the 










1 42 55 11 41 57 
2 39 52 12 38 39 
3 40 57 13 36 41 
4 33 58 14 42 48 
5 35 50 15 39 51 
6 38 52 16 37 55 
7 30 56 17 40 43 
8 38 48 18 45 42 
9 39 55 19 42 43 
10 40 58 20 38 51 
 
For the hybrid GA-LQP P-C method, let the population size 500N = , the 
crossover probability 0.2crr =  , the mutation probability 0.5mur = , and the maximal 
number of iteration be equal to 100. The parameters used by the LQP P-C method are 
the same as that adopted by the numerical example in Subsection 5.2.  Figure 4.5 
depicts the stepwise increasing trend in terms of the fitness function value of the 
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hybrid GA-LQP P-C method for solving this example. It indicates that the fitness 




























Figure 4.5 Change of the fitness function values of the large example solved by the 
hybrid GA-LQP P-C method 
 
 To conclude, it can be seen that the enumeration method incorporated with 
LQP P-C method can find the optimal solution for the small example. For the large 
example, the hybrid GA-LQP P-C method depicts its convergence.  
4.6 Discussion and Summary 
This chapter has proposed a new competitive facility location problem which 
significantly extends the competitive facility location problem with the SPE 
constraints. Since the limited production capacity of a manufacturer in a decentralized 
supply chain cannot be neglected, this chapter has successfully developed the SCNE 
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model with production capacity constraints, which is formulated by the VI and solved 
by the LQP P-C method. By virtue of the SCNE model with the production capacity 
constraints, it has created an MPEC model for the proposed competitive facility 
location problem. Moreover, a meta-heuristics method called the hybrid GA-LQP P-C 
method has been designed for solving the MPEC model. The numerical examples 
have not only demonstrated the impact of production capacity constraints on the 
SCNE and the sensitivity analysis results of the MPEC model for the competitive 
facility location problem, but also shown the feasibility of the solution methods. To 
some extent, the proposed MPEC model in this chapter can more or less help a 
company to anticipate the reaction of the market after he enters the market. This can 
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CHAPTER 5 MULTIPERIOD PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION 
PLANNING WITH TRANSFER PRICING AND DEMAND 
UNCERTAINTY 
5.1 Introduction 
With consideration of demand uncertainty, this chapter develops a chance 
constrained programming model for a global supply chain on a four-tier network 
comprising external raw materials suppliers, plants, DCs and customers. The 
objective of this model is to maximize the expected after-tax profit of an MNC over a 
taxation period by determining the number of product to be manufactured at each 
plant, the amount to be supplied to each DC, the optimal level of flows of raw 
materials from external vendors to plants, inventory levels of raw materials and 
products at each plant, and the transfer price between each plant and each DC. In 
order to capture the fluctuation of time-dependent parameters such as currency 
exchange rates, the taxation period is divided into several sub-periods. Assuming a 
stochastic demand in each sub-period, the model is formulated as a nondifferentiable 
maximization problem with chance constraints for inventory control strategy at each 
DC. To solve the model, a penalty function method embedded with a simulated 
annealing procedure will be carried out. After moving the chance constraints into the 
objective function to penalize the violation of chance constraints, the resulting model 
is a linear constrained maximization problem. Hence, Phrase I of the simplex method 
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in linear program is employed to sample a solution in implementation of Metropolis 
Monte Carlo simulation in the simulated annealing procedure. 
5.2 Problem Statement 
Let us consider a global supply chain of an MNC. The supply chain consists of 
four tiers - external vendors of raw materials, plants, DCs and customers. The four 
tiers are located in different countries. It is assumed that the MNC owns all of the 
plants which produce a single product and all DCs which sell the product to the 
markets. The global supply chain operates as follows. Plants purchase raw materials 
from external vendors; in turn, DCs purchase the product from the plants and serve 
their own markets. For the sake of convenience, it is further assumed that each DC 
and its market are in the same country. Figure 5.1 provides a schematic example of a 
global supply chain network with seven external vendors located in three countries, 
three plants in countries two and three, six DCs in countries three and four and six 
markets served by these six DCs, respectively.    

































Figure 5.1 A four-tier global supply chain network  
 
Most countries have a fixed profit taxation period, typically one year, for MNCs. 
During the taxation period, a number of parameters including market demands and 
raw material price discounts offered by external vendors may fluctuate seasonally. To 
consider the impact of these time-dependent parameters on tactical decisions, the 
entire taxation period can be divided into several sub-periods.  
Currency exchange rates are important issues in tactical supply chain decisions 
for an MNC. Normally it is difficult to forecast a currency exchange rate. Hence, in 
this chapter it is assumed that the currency exchange rates of each country in each 
sub-period are random.    
Demand uncertainty is a practical concern for global supply chain managers 
because demand is forecasted when planning a global supply chain, and the forecast 
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may be biased. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume a stochastic demand faced 
by each DC in each sub-period rather than a deterministic demand. Inventory control 
at plants and DCs is vital to a global supply chain because inventory cost is a major 
component of the total cost. For example, in some sub-periods, plants may purchase 
more raw materials if the saving from price discounts is able to offset the additional 
inventory cost for one sub-period. With stochastic demand, the inventory at each DC 
becomes a random variable. Since each DC has limited inventory capacity, an 
inventory control policy is needed to ensure a level of confidence that the inventory 
will not exceed the capacity.  
According to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
international guidelines based on the arm’s length principle, the transfer price for a 
product are limited within a range around the real market price. As a requirement for 
the justification of transfer prices to tax authorities, all the transfer prices charged by 
the same plant must be the same (Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2001).  
Finally, to make the calculations of cost and profit comparable, currencies of all 
the countries involved in the global supply chain are converted to a common currency, 
say, the US dollar. 
Based on the preceding assumptions, the multiperiod supply chain planning with 
transfer pricing and demand uncertainty aims to maximize the expected value of after-
tax profit of the MNC over the entire taxation period by determining the amount of 
production at each plant in each sub-period, the amount of supply to each DC in each 
sub-period, the optimal flow level of both raw materials from external vendors to 
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plants in each sub-period, inventory levels of raw materials and products at each plant 
in each sub-period, and the transfer price charged by each plant in each sub-period.   
5.3 Mathematical Model 
Before presenting the model, the parameters and decision variables used in the 
model are stated. For the sake of representation, ( )0hiinr , ( )0iinp  and ( )0jinv  are 
used to represent the inventory of raw materials in plants, final products in plants and 
the final products in DCs at the beginning of sub-period 1. Except for these, for clarity 
and ease of reading, all parameters are denoted by capital letters, and all decision 
variables are in lower case letters.  Following are the parameters and decision 
variables.  
Sets and indices 
[ ]1,2, ,T"   Set of sub-periods, indexed by t, and T is the total number of 
sub-periods. 
H Set of raw material types that are used to produce or assemble 
the product, indexed by h. 
L  Set of countries where external vendors are located, indexed by 
l. 
M Set of countries where plants are located, indexed by m. 
N Set of countries where DCs are located, indexed by n. 
mP  Set of plants in country m M∈ , indexed by i . 
h
lS  Set of vendors in country l L∈  that can supply raw material 
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type h H∈ , indexed by s . 
nW  Set of DCs in country n N∈ , indexed by j . 
Parameters associated with the international factors 
( )mnDUTY t  Import duty rate on value of the product shipped from country 
m to country n in sub-period t . 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,m n lE t E t E t  Currency exchange rates of countries m, n and l to a common 
currency in sub-period t , respectively [dollar/monetary units of 
country m, n and l].  
,i iLTP UTP   Lower and upper bounds of transfer price of product charged 
by plant i to any DC [monetary units of the country where plant 
i  is located /unit of the product].  
, ,m n lTAX TAX TAX  Corporate profit tax rates in countries m, n and l, respectively.  
Parameters associated with costs, prices and capacities  
( )hsSCR t  Supply capacity of raw material type h  of vendor s  in sub-
period t [number of units of raw material type h]. 
iPCAP  Production capacity of plant i  during one sub-period [number 
of units of products] 
h
iICR  Inventory capacity of raw material type h  at plant i  [number 
of units of raw material type h]. 
iICP  Inventory capacity of the product at plant i  [number of units 
of the product]. 
iICW  Inventory capacity of the product at DC j  [number of units 
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of the product]. 
ijTC   Transaction cost per unit (not including the import duties) of 
the product shipped from plant i  to DC j  [monetary units of 
country where plant i  is located/unit of the product]. 
iPC   Production cost per unit of the product at plant i  [monetary 
units of country where plant i  is located/unit of the product]. 
h
sSP   Selling price of raw material h  by vendor s [monetary units 
of country where vendor s  is located/ unit of raw material 
type h].  
h
siTC   Transaction cost per unit of raw material type h obtained by 
plant i from raw material supplier s  [monetary units of 
country where plant i  is located / unit of raw material h]. 
h
iIC   Inventory cost per unit of raw material type h  in plant i  for 
one sub-period [monetary units of country where plant i  is 
located / unit of raw material h per sub-period]. 
iIC   Inventory cost per unit of the product at plant i  for one sub-
period [monetary units of country where plant i  is located / 
unit of the product per sub-period]. 
jMP   Market price of the product at DC j [monetary units of 
country of DC j]. 
1
jIC  Inventory cost per unit of the product at DC j  for one sub-
period [monetary units of country where DC j  is located / 
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unit of the product per sub-period]. 
2
jIC  Outsourced inventory cost per unit of product at DC j  for 
one sub-period in the case that the DC’s warehouse cannot 
accommodate all the product [monetary units of country 
where DC j  is located / unit of the product per sub-period]. 
Parameters associated with stochastic demand, bill of material and raw material 
discount rates 
hAMO  Quantity of raw material of type h needed to produce one unit 
of the product [number of units of raw material type h / unit 
of the product]. 
( )jD t  Stochastic demand for the product at DC j  in sub-period t 
[number of unit of the product]. 
( ),jf t x  Probability density function of random variable ( )jD t , where 
x  is the random variable.  
( )hsiDIS t  Price discount rate of raw material type h  supplied by vendor 
s  to plant i in sub-period t . 
Miscellaneous parameters 
( )0hiinr  Inventory of raw material type h  at plant i  at the beginning 
of sub-period 1 [number of units of raw material type h]. 
( )0iinp  Inventory of the product at plant i  at the beginning of sub-
period 1 [number of units of the product]. 
( )0jinv  Inventory of the product at DC j  at the beginning of sub-
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period 1 [number of units of the product] 
Decision variables 
( )itp t  Transfer price of the product, charged by plant i  to any DC in 
sub-period t [monetary units of country where plant i  is 
located/unit of the product]. 
( )ipp t  Number of units of product produced by plant i  in sub-period 
t  [number of units of the product]. 
( )ijpw t  Quantity of the products, produced at plant i  and shipped to 
DC j  in sub-period t  [number of units of the product].  
( )hsiraw t   Quantity of raw material type h  supplied by vendor s to plant 
i  in sub-period t  [number of units of raw material h]. 
( )hiinr t  Inventory of raw material h  in plant i  during sub-period t  
[number of units of raw material h]. 
( )iinp t  Inventory of the product in plant i  during sub-period t  
[number of units of the product] 
For the sake of presentation, let ( )X t  denote the vector of all the decision variables 
associated with sub-period t , 1, 2, ,t T= " , and X  be the vector of all the decision 
variables, namely, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , : , 1, 2,...,
, , , , , ,
h h
i i ij si i i
h
m n l
tp t pp t pw t raw t inr t inp t
X t t T
i P j W s S m M n N l L h H
⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (5.1) 
 ( ) : 1,2, ,X X t t T= =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦"  (5.2) 
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5.3.1 Expected value of after-tax profit for a plant 
In sub-period t , the profit of plant i  in country m M∈  is defined by the revenue 
from selling the product to all DCs minus production cost, transaction cost, inventory 
cost and the cost for raw materials purchasing. Since the currency exchange rates 
( )mE t  and ( )lE t  are random, the expected value of the profit of plant i  in sub-period 
t , denoted by ( )( )iEPP X t  is expressed as:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
         
         




i m ij i ij
n N j W
h h
m i i i i m i i
h H
h h h h h
m si si l si s si
h H l L s S
m
EPP X t E E t pw t tp t TC
E t pp t PC inp t IC E t inr t IC
E t raw t TC E t raw t SP DIS t




⎛ ⎡ ⎤= × −⎜ ⎣ ⎦⎝
⎡ ⎤− × + × − ×⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦






The right hand side of equation (5.3) comprises of four terms. The first term is the 
revenue from selling the product to all the DCs minus the transaction cost between the 
plant and the DCs; the second term is the sum of production and inventory costs of the 
product in sub-period t ; the third term is the inventory cost of raw materials in sub-
period t ; the fourth term is the sum of transaction cost between the plant and external 
raw material suppliers and the expense of purchasing the raw materials. 
Adding up the profit shown in equation (5.3) over all sub-periods in the entire 
taxation duration yields the expected before-tax profit made by plant i , which is a 
function of all the decision variables X , denoted by ( )iEBTPP X : 






EBTPP X EPP X t i P m M
=
= ∈ ∈∑  (5.4) 
Because tax is levied only if a plant makes a profit over the entire taxation period, 
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the after-tax profit made by plant i , denoted by ( )iEATPP X , can be expressed by a 
step-wise function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )






TAX BTPP X EBTPP X
EATPP X i P m M
BTPP X
− >⎧⎪= ∈ ∈⎨⎪⎩
 (5.5) 
5.3.2 Expected value of after-tax profit for a DC 
Demand uncertainty of the product at DC j  in sub-period t  causes stochastic 
inventory, which is denoted by ( )jinv t : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
m
j ij j j
m M i P
inv t pw t inv t D t
+
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  (5.6) 
where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 max 1 ,0
m m
ij j j ij j j
m M i P m M i P
pw t inv t D t pw t inv t D t
+
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞+ − − = + − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
The term ( )
m
ij
m M i P
pw t
∈ ∈
∑ ∑  in the right hand side of equation (5.6) is the number of 
products purchased by DC j  from all the plants in sub-period t ; the term ( )1jinv t −  
is the inventory of the product in the sub-period ( )1t − . Note that since the demand 
faced by DC j  in sub-period t , ( )jD t , is a random variable, ( )jinv t  is also a 
random variable. The probability density function of ( )jinv t  can be obtained in 
subsection 5.3.3. In reality, equation (5.6) indicates a fundamental phenomenon that 
inventory exists if and only if the supply exceeds demand. In addition, it should be 
pointed out that as ( )jinv t  exceeds the inventory capacity of DC j , the DC has to 
look for a thirty-party warehouse to store the inventory over capacity. It results in a 
higher unit inventory cost than the inventory cost at DC j . Hence, the inventory cost 
of DC j  during sub-period t , denoted by ( )jTIC t , is expressed as: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2j j j j j jTIC t IC inv t IC inv t ICW +⎡ ⎤= × + × −⎣ ⎦  (5.7) 
where ( ) ( )( )max ,0j j j jinv t ICW inv t ICW+⎡ ⎤− = −⎣ ⎦ .  The first term of right hand side 
of equation (5.7) represents the cost of storing products in DC j , while the second 
term represents the cost of storing products in a thirty party warehouse.  
In sub-period t , the real quantity of the product from the DC j  purchased by 
customers is a random variable, denoted by ( )jrd t , is expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )min , 1
m
j j ij j
m M i P
rd t D t pw t inv t
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (5.8) 
Equation (5.8) describes a fact that the number of the products purchased by 
consumers cannot exceed the available supply of the product. Thus, the revenue of 
DC j  from selling the product in sub-period t  is a random variable defined by 
 ( ) ( )j j jTIW t MP rd t= ×  (5.9) 
It is straightforward to check that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
min 0, 1
      1 max 0, 1




j j ij j j
m M i P
ij j ij j j
m M i P m M i P
ij j j n
m M i P
rd t D t pw t inv t D t
pw t inv t pw t inv t D t
pw t inv t inv t t T j W n N
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= + + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= + − − + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= + − − = ∈ ∈
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ "
 (5.10) 
According to equations (5.9)-(5.10), the revenue obtained from selling products for 
DC j  in sub-period t , denoted by ( )jTIW t , can be calculated by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
m
j j j j ij j j
m M i P
TIW t MP rd t MP pw t inv t inv t
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= × = × + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (5.11) 
The expected profit in sub-period t  for DC j , denoted by ( ),jEPW X t  can be 
expressed as follows: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
                         1
j n j n j
m ij i mn
m M i M
EPW X t E E t TIW t E t TIC t
E t pw t tp t DUTY t
∈ ∈
= × − ×
⎞⎡ ⎤− × × × + ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎠∑ ∑
 (5.12) 
There are three terms in the right hand side of equation (5.12). The first term is the 
revenue from selling the product to consumers; the second term is the inventory cost 
and the third term is for the expense of purchasing the product from the plants, 
including import duties. Accordingly, the expected before-tax profit gained by a DC 
over the entire taxation period can be calculated as follows:  






EBTPW X EPW X t j W n N
=
= ∈ ∈∑  (5.13) 
The expected value of the after-tax profit for DC j , denoted by ( )jEATPW X , can be 
expressed by the step-wise function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 ,  if 0 
, ,




TAX EBTPW X EBTPW X
EATPW X j W n N
EBTPW X
− >⎧⎪= ∈ ∈⎨⎪⎩
(5.14) 
5.3.3 Probability density function of inventory for final products in each DC 
Let us first derive the probability density function of random variable ( )1jinv . 
According to equation (5.6), it follows that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 max 0, 1 0 1
m
j ij j j
m M i P
inv pw inv D
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (5.15) 
For any 0x > , cumulative distribution function of random variable ( )1jinv , denoted 
by ( )1,IjF x , can be expressed as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1, 1 0 1




j ij j j
m M i P
j ij j
m M i P
F x P pw inv D x
F pw inv x
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= + − ≤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦




where ( )1,jF x  is the cumulative distribution function of stochastic demand ( )1jD . 
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Let ( )1,Ijf x  denote the probability density function of ( )1jinv , and equation (5.16) 
implies that 




j j ij j
m M i P
dF x
f x f pw inv x
dx ∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (5.17) 
where ( ) ( )0 1 0
m
ij j
m M i P
x pw inv
∈ ∈
< ≤ +∑ ∑ .  




( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1,0 1 0 max 0, 1 0 1 0
             1 0 1 0





j j ij j j
m M i P
ij j j
m M i P
j ij j
m M i P
f P inv t P pw inv D





⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − = = + − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= + − ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠





For ( ) ( )1 0
m
ij j
m M i P
x pw inv
∈ ∈
> +∑ ∑ , the probability density function of ( )1jinv  is 
 ( )1,0 0Ijf =  (5.19) 
It is now ready to derive the probability density function of random variable 
( )jinv t  for 2t ≥ . Let ( ),IjF t x  denote the cumulative distribution function of random 
variable ( )jinv t . Eqn (5.6) implies that  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
, max 1 ,0               





m M i Pm
m
I
j ij j j
m M i P
ij j j j j
m M i P
pw I
ij j j j j
m M i P
F t x P pw t inv t D t x
P pw t inv t D t x inv t P inv t





⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − − ≤⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= + − − < − = × − = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠




( ) ( )




















m M i P
pw inv I
j ij j
m M i P
d
F pw t x f t









⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − × − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
















< ≤ +∑ ∑ ∑ , the probability density function of 
( )jinv t , denoted by ( ),Ijf t x , can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )










m M i Pm
m
I I
j j ij j
m M i P
pw inv I
j ij j
m M i P
f t x f pw t x f t






⎛ ⎞= − × − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠




The probability of ( ) 0jinv t =  can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )










m M i Pm
m
I I
j j ij j
m M i P
pw inv I
j ij j
m M i P
f t x F pw t f t






⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − × − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠















> +∑ ∑ ∑ , the probability density function of ( )jinv t  is: 
 ( ), 0Ijf t x =  (5.23) 
5.3.4 Chance constrained programming model  
Expected value of the after-tax profit for the MNC, denoted by function ( )ATP X , 
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is equal to the sum of after-tax profit for all the plants shown in eqn. (5.5) and the 
expected value of the after-tax profit for all the DCs shown in eqn. (5.14), namely,  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
m n
i j
m M i P n N j P
ATP X EATPP X EATPW X
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= +∑ ∑ ∑∑  (5.24) 
The multiperiod global supply chain planning with transfer pricing and demand 
uncertainty can be formulated into the following maximization model: 
 ( )Maximize ATP X  (5.25) 
s.t. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , , , , 1,...,
h
l
h h h h
i i si i m
l L s S
inr t inr t raw t AMO pp t i P m M h H t T
∈ ∈
= − + − × ∈ ∈ ∈ =∑∑
 (5.26) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , , , 1,2, ,
n
i i i ij m
n N j W
inp t inp t pp t pw t i P m M t T
∈ ∈
= − + − ∈ ∈ =∑ ∑ "  (5.27) 




m M i P
raw t SCR t s S h H l L t T
∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ =∑ ∑ "  (5.28) 
 ( ) , , , 1, 2, ,i i minp t ICP i P m M t T≤ ∈ ∈ = "  (5.29) 
 ( ) , , , 1, 2, ,h hi i minr t ICR i P m M t T≤ ∈ ∈ = "  (5.30) 
 ( )( )Pr 1 , , , 1,2, ,j j j ninv t ICW j W n N t T≤ ≥ −α ∈ ∈ = "  (5.31) 
 ( ) , ,i i i mLTP tp t UTP i P m M≤ ≤ ∈ ∈  (5.32) 
 ( ) , , , 1, 2,...,i i mpp t PCAP i P m M t T≤ ∈ ∈ =  (5.33) 
 ( ) 0, 1, 2, ,X t t T≥ = "  (5.34) 
Eqn. (5.25) is the objective function which is to maximize the expected valve of the 
after-tax profit. Eqns. (5.26)-(5.27) are inventory conservation equations for all raw 
materials and the product at a plant in each sub-period, respectively. Note that 
parameters, ,hAMO h H∈  in eqn. (5.26) reflect the bill of materials. Eqn. (5.28) is the 
supply capacity constraint of each type of raw material at a vendor in each sub-period. 
Eqns. (5.29)-(5.30) are inventory capacity constraints of a raw material type and the 
 CHAPTER 5 MULTIPERIOD PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION PLANNING 
 90
product at plant i  in each sub-period, respectively. Eqn. (5.31) is the chance 
constraint ensuring that the probability of inventory of the product at DC j  in each 
sub-period greater than the inventory capacity is at most jα , where jα  is a pre-
specified threshold. Eqn. (5.32) gives the feasible interval of transfer price. Eqn. (5.33) 
is the production capacity constraint for each plant. Eqn. (5.34) represents 
nonnegativity of the decision variables. 
Because the after-tax profits gained by all the plants and DCs are step-wise 
functions with respect to the decision variables, the objective function defined by eqn. 
(5.24) is a nondifferentiable function. Therefore, the chance constrained programming 
model (5.25)-(5.34) is a nondifferentiable optimization problem.  
5.4 Solution Algorithm 
As shown in subsection 5.3.3, the probability density function of ( )jinv t  depends 
on the probability density function of ( )1iinv t −  and the decision variables, ( )1ijpw  , 
( )2ijpw , " , ( )ijpw t  for all ,mi P m M∈ ∈ . The chance constraints represented by 
eqn. (5.31), thus, are nonlinear and nonconvex with respect to decision variable X . 
Although it is able to convert the nondifferentiable objective function (5.25) into a 
continuously differentiable one by the technique used by Vidal and Goetschalckx 
(2001), the resulting model is still a nonconcave maximization problem that is one of 
intractable problems with classical algorithms in nonlinear programming. 
Alternatively, simulated annealing (SA) method, one of the artificial intelligent 
algorithms, can be applied to solve the chance constrained programming model (5.25)
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-(5.34) since SA method has been successfully applied to some intractable 
optimization models arising from production planning and control (Onwubolu, 2002). 
The simulated annealing method originated from an analogy with the physical 
annealing process to find low energy states of a solid in a heat bath (Metropolist et al., 
1953). It is a stochastic method to avoid getting stuck in a local, non-global optimum 
in a search for the global optimum. This is made by accepting transitions 
corresponding to a decrease in function value in addition to transitions corresponding 
to an increase in function value. The latter is done in a limited way by means of a 
stochastic acceptance criterion. In the course of the maximization process, probability 
of accepting deteriorations descends slowly towards zero by using a cooling schedule. 
These 'deteriorations' make it possible to climb out of the local optimum and explore 
the feasible region of the problem entirely. This procedure will lead to a (near) global 
optimum. In general, an SA method consists of two main steps - Metropolis Monte 
Carlo Simulation and cooling schedule (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983).  
The chance constraints in model (5.25)-(5.34) bring a computational challenge in 
implementation of the Metropolis Monte Carlo Simulation due to their nonlinearity 
and nonconvexity. To overcome such a difficulty, these chance constraints are put into 
the objective function (5.25) by means of the penalty function method (Bazaraa et al., 
1993). The induced linearly constrained optimization model with a penalty function 
can be formulated as follows:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1





jX t n N j W
X ATP X Z X ICWα∈Ω = ∈ ∈
Ψ µ = −µ −∑∑ ∑  (5.35) 
where µ  is a positive penalty parameter, Ω  is the set of feasible solutions satisfying 
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constraints (5.26)-(5.30) and (5.32)-(5.34), namely, 
 { } satisfies constraints (26)-(30) and (32)-(34)X XΩ =  (5.36) 
( ) ( )j
j
inv tZ Xα  is a number such that the probability of random variable ( )jinv t  greater 
than this number is equal to jα  for a given X ∈Ω , i.e., 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )Pr jjinv t jinv t Z Xα≥ = α  (5.37) 
According to the probability definition, it is easy to verify that  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )Pr 1   if and only if  , ,j
j
inv t
j j j j ninv t ICW Z X ICW j W n Nα≤ ≥ −α ≤ ∈ ∈
 (5.38) 
Therefore, the second term in the right hand side of eqn. (5.35) penalizes violation of 
the chance constraints in the model (5.25)-(5.34), and it is referred to as the penalty 
function. 
It can be seen that all the constraints defining set Ω  are linear. Hence, the 
following SA method can be employed to obtain a solution to the linearly constrained 
maximization model (5.35) beginning with an initial solution ( )0X ∈Ω . 
Simulation annealing procedure for solving the linearly constrained maximization 
model (5.35) 
Step 0: (Initialization) Let initial solution ( )0X ∈Ω , ( )0τ  and τˆ  be the initial and final 
temperatures, 0 1σ< <  be the parameter in the temperature cooling schedule, 
IteMax  be the maximum number of iterations used in the Metropolis Monte 
Carlo Simulation. Let UB  be a predetermined vector with the same dimension 
of the decision variable vector X , : 0k =  and : 0k′ = .  
Step 1: (Metropolis Monte Carlo Simulation)  
Step 1.1: (Sampling) Randomly generate a vector ( ]0,UBξ∈  and then gain a 
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solution in set ( ) ( ){ }k kX X XΩ −ξ ≤ ≤ + ξ∩  , denoted by ( )kX , by 
applying Phase I of the simplex method in linear program, where 
( )( )max 1, /100kUB X= . 
Step 1.2: (Boltzmaann acceptance criterion) If ( )( ) ( )( )k kX XΨ > Ψ , then let 
( ) ( )1k kX X+ = . Otherwise, randomly generate a number ( )1 0,1λ ∈  and 
perform the operation: 
 ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
( )
11 ,   if exp /
,  otherwise








⎧ ⎡ ⎤λ ≤ Ψ −Ψ τ⎪ ⎣ ⎦= ⎨⎪⎩
 (5.39) 
 Step 1.3: (Sampling termination criterion) Let : 1k k= + . If k IteMax= , go to 
Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 1.1.  
Step 2: (Perform a proportional cooling schedule) Let ( ) ( )1 :k kτ στ′ ′+ =  and : 1k k′ ′= + , 
go to Step 3. 
Step 3: (Stop criterion) If ( ) ˆkτ τ′ > , let ( ) ( )0 kX X=  and : 0k = , go to Step 1. Otherwise, 
stop and the output is ( )kX   
The above SA procedure starts with the Metropolis Monte Carlo simulation at a 
high temperature and consists of a pair of nested Do-loops. The outer loop sets the 
temperature and the inner-most loop, namely, Step 1, runs a Metropolis Monte Carlo 
simulation at that temperature. Step 2 presents a proportional cooling schedule to 
decrease the temperature. As set Ω  is a polyhedral, compared to the interval 
constraints, it is not easy to sample a feasible solution. Thus, there is a need of a 
systematic approach that can randomly generate a solution in a polyhedral. Step 1.1 
contributes such an approach by employing Phrase I of the simplex method in linear 
 CHAPTER 5 MULTIPERIOD PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION PLANNING 
 94
program to sample in the set of feasible solutions. Step 1.2 is the typical Boltzmann 
acceptance criterion that is able to accept a solution with a lower objective function 
value. 
Having a solution to the linearly constrained maximization model (5.35) 
corresponding to penalty parameter µ , the penalty function method will increase the 
value of the penalty parameter if the solution violates any chance constraints. The 
penalty function method embedded with the simulated annealing procedure can be 
presented below.   
Penalty function method embedded with the simulated annealing procedure 
Step 0: (Initialization) Let 0ε >  be a termination tolerance, 0µ  be an initial positive 
penalty parameter and a known parameter 1β > . Let 1K =  and 0µ = µ .  
Step 1: (Find an initial solution) Find a feasible solution in set Ω , denoted by ( )KY , 
by Phrase I of the simplex method. 
Step 2: (Invoke the SA procedure) Figure a solution to the maximization model (5.35) 
associated with penalty parameter µ , denoted by ( )1KY + , by the preceding 
simulated annealing procedure starting with ( ) ( )0 KX Y= . 








t n N j W
Z Y ICW+α
= ∈ ∈
µ − ≤ ε∑∑ ∑ , then 
stop and output ( )1KY + ; otherwise, go so Step 4. 
Step 4: (Enlarge the penalty parameter) Let :µ = βµ , : 1K K= +  and go to Step 2.  
Convergence of the above method can be guaranteed if the simulated annealing 
method can lead to a global optimum of linearly constrained maximization (5.35) at 
Step 2 (see, Bazaraa et al., 1993). Although the simulated annealing procedure is able 
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to theoretically find a global optimum for an optimization problem, however, it 
usually terminates at a local optimal solution in a limited computational time. In other 
words, the penalty function method embedded with the simulated annealing procedure 
is a heuristic algorithm.      
5.5 Numerical Examples 
In this section, hypothetical examples are constructed to demonstrate the model 
and solution algorithm since it is difficult to obtain any example in the literature with 
sufficient data for this problem. Assume that an MNC assembling personal computers 
(PCs) possesses a global supply chain comprising five external vendors, three plants 
and five DCs serving five markets as shown in Figure 5.2. These three assembling 
plants are hypothetically assumed to be located in Thailand, Mexico and India, 
respectively, and they purchase CPUs, mainboards, hard disks, DVD-ROMS and 
monitors, forming five types of raw materials, from five external vendors located in 
Taiwan. It is further assumed that these five DCs are located in USA, Britain, Canada, 
Germany and Japan, respectively, and that each vendor is able to provide all five parts 
(raw materials). The objective of the company is to maximize its overall after-tax 
profit over a one-year taxation period, which is divided into four quarters, namely, 
4T = . As for the demand uncertainty, it is assumed that the stochastic demand in each 
quarter in each market follows a normal distribution.  






























Figure 5.2 Global supply chain network of the numerical example 
 
Market price, time-dependent discount and supply capacity for each type of raw 
material are tabulated in Tables 5.1-5.3. Tables 5.4-5.5 list the unit transaction and 
inventory costs of each type of material at a plant; Tables 5.6-5.7 give the unit 
production and inventory costs of PCs at each plant; Tables 5.8-5.9 present production 
and inventory capacities of PCs at each plant; Tables 5.10-5.11 show inventory 
capacity of each type of raw material at each plant and bill of the parts (materials) to 
produce a PC. Regarding each DC, the unit transaction cost between a plant and the 
DC, the unit inventory and outsourced inventory costs of PCs, and the inventory 
capacity of PCs are shown in Tables 5.12-5.15. As to the international factors, time-
dependent currency exchanges rates, profit tax rate in each country and allowable 
intervals of transfer pricing are shown in Tables 5.16-5.18, respectively. Table 5.19 
gives market price of PCs in each market; Tables 5.20-5.21 list mean and standard 
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derivation of the normal distribution for the stochastic demand in each sub-period in a 
market, respectively.  
 
Table 5.1 Prices of raw materials 
Raw material CPU Hard disk Mainboard DVD-ROM Monitor 
Price 
(TWD/Unit) 
4200 3000 4500 1200 8400 
 
Table 5.2 Discount of each type of raw material in each sub-period 
Vendor Sub-Period 1 2 3 4 
CPU 0.92 1 1 0.9 
Hard disk 1 0.94 0.92 0.95 
Mainboard 0.9 0.94 0.92 0.95 
DVD-ROM 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.91 
1 
Monitor 1 0.96 0.94 0.95 
CPU 0.9 0.94 0.88 0.95 
Hard disk 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.97 
Mainboard 0.92 0.93 0.93 1 
DVD-ROM 0.94 0.98 0.92 0.96 
2 





 CHAPTER 5 MULTIPERIOD PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION PLANNING 
 98
Table 5.2 Discount of each type of raw material in each sub-period (Continued) 
CPU 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.95 
Hard disk 0.93 0.98 1 0.94 
Mainboard 0.95 1 0.87 0.93 
DVD-ROM 0.96 0.93 0.8 0.97 
3 
Monitor 0.94 0.9 0.84 0.96 
CPU 0.99 0.93 0.7 0.93 
Hard disk 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.95 
Mainboard 0.96 0.88 0.85 1 
DVD-ROM 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.93 
4 
Monitor 0.98 0.86 0.94 0.97 
CPU 1 0.88 0.94 0.99 
Hard disk 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.94 
Mainboard 1 0.89 1 0.95 
DVD-ROM 0.94 0.94 0.85 0.96 
5 
Monitor 0.95 0.96 0.88 1 
 
Table 5.3 Supply capacity of raw materials of each vendor in each sub-period (Unit) 
     Vendor Sub-period 1 2 3 4 
CPU 300 280 290 350 
Hard disk 150 140 145 180 
Mainboard 190 180 190 210 
DVD-ROM 210 200 205 240 
1 
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Table 5.3 Supply capacity of raw materials of each vendor in each sub-period (Unit) 
(Continued) 
CPU 150 160 180 140 
Hard disk 200 210 220 160 
Mainboard 230 240 250 200 
DVD-ROM 210 220 230 180 
2 
Monitor 220 240 250 190 
CPU 220 200 190 240 
Hard disk 210 195 180 230 
Mainboard 220 190 185 225 
DVD-ROM 150 140 135 180 
3 
Monitor 180 170 160 170 
CPU 210 220 160 130 
Hard disk 190 200 150 120 
Mainboard 195 200 140 110 
DVD-ROM 190 210 160 140 
4 
Monitor 180 190 145 130 
CPU 200 190 140 200 
Hard disk 200 190 130 160 
Mainboard 240 220 160 180 
DVD-ROM 210 200 150 180 
5 
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Table 5.4 Unit transaction cost related to raw materials at each plant (TWD/Unit) 
Plant CPU Hard disk Mainboard DVD-ROM Monitor 
1(Thailand) 300 200 320 80 600 
2(Mexico) 600 410 640 160 1200 
3(India) 350 225 360 90 700 
 
Table 5.5 Unit inventory cost of each type of raw material at each plant 





Plant 1(THB/Unit/Unit time) 20 19 21 12.5 400 
Plant 2(MXN/Unit/Unit time) 5 4.5 5.25 3 9.5 
Plant 3(INR/Unit/Unit time) 19.5 19 20.5 12 39 
 
Table 5.6 Unit assembly cost of PCs at each plant 
Plant 1(THB/Unit) 2(MXN/Unit) 3(INR/Unit) 
Assembly cost 140 30 150 
 
Table 5.7 Unit inventory cost of PCs at each plant 
DC Thailand(THB/unit) Mexico(MXN/unit) India(INR/unit) 
Inventory cost 500 150 520 
 
Table 5.8 Production capacity of each plant 
Plant 1 2 3 
Capacity (Unit) 200 250 230 
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Table 5.9 Inventory capacity of PCs at each plant 
Plant 1 2 3 
Capacity (Unit) 300 350 320 
 
Table 5.10 Inventory capacity of each type of raw material at each plant 
Raw Material CPU Hard disk Mainboard DVD-ROM Monitor 
Plant 1(Unit) 500 300 450 400 300 
Plant 2(Unit) 450 250 430 350 300 
Plant 3(Unit) 400 200 410 340 250 
 
Table 5.11 Bill of material 
Raw 
material 
CPU Hard disk Mainboard DVD-ROM Moritor 
BOM 1 1 1 1 1 
 











Plant 1 (THB/Unit) 50 45 55 43 25 
Plant 2 (MXN/Unit) 5 12 5.5 12.5 8 
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25 13.75 29.5 20.475 2700 
 













30 16.75 35.5 25.475 3100 
 
Table 5.15 Inventory capacity of PCs at each DC 
DC 1 2 3 4 5 
Capacity (Unit) 250 270 290 240 230 
 
Table 5.16 Expected value of currency exchange rates in each sub-period 
Sub-period 
Country 
1 2 3 4 
Thailand 0.0240 0.0242 0.0243 0.0241 
Mexico 0.0860 0.0865 0.0862 0.0863 
India 0.0218 0.0217 0.0215 0.0217 
USA 1 1 1 1 
Britain 1.82 1.83 1.80 1.79 
Canada 0.8456 0.8455 0.8454 0.8455 
Germany 1.23 1.24 1.22 1.21 
Japan 0.0091 0.0092 0.0093 0.0094 
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Table 5.17 Revenue tax rate in each country 
Country Thailand Mexico India USA Britain Canada Germany Japan 
tax 10% 20% 15% 35% 30% 13.7% 15% 20% 
 
Table 5.18 Allowable intervals for transfer pricing 
Plant Thailand(THB/unit) Mexico(MXN/unit) India(INR/unit) 
Transfer price 
range 
[89000,93000] [24000,26000] [100000,104000] 
 













Price 2200 1210 2620 1780 244000 
 
Table 5.20 Mean of normal distribution for the stochastic demand in each sub-period 
at each demand market  
     Demand market 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 200 210 220 190 180 
2 210 190 200 190 200 
3 190 180 165 170 190 
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Table 5.21 Scenario 1 of standard deviation of normal distribution for the stochastic 
demand in each sub-period at each demand market  
     Demand market 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 40 42 40 39 43 
2 30 29 28 33 31 
3 52 51 50 53 51 
4 21 22 23 20 19 
 
We assume that the confidence level in defining the chance constraint for each 
DC is 80%, i.e., 0.2, 1, 2, ,5j j= = "α , and that the inventory of raw materials and 
PCs in plants or DCs at the beginning of sub-period 1 is 0. Without loss of generality, 
all of the duties are assumed to be 0. In addition, it is set that ( )0 1000000τ = , ˆ 100τ = , 
0.9σ = , 1.5β = , 0.001ε = , IteMax = 10 and 0 40µ =  for implementing the 
proposed solution algorithm for the example.  
Figure 5.3 depicts changes of the objective function ( ),Xψ µ , shown in eqn. 
(5.35) , and the value of the penalty function shown in the second term of objective 
function ( ),Xψ µ  with the number of iterations for the penalty function method. 
According to Figure 5.3, it can be seen that the value of penalty function at the fifth 
iteration is equal to zero; this means that the solution is US$ 62.7 10× . 
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Figure 5.3 Convergent trend of the penalty function method embedded in the 
simulated annealing procedure 
 
At each iteration, the penalty function method invokes the simulated annealing 
procedure for solving linearly constrained maximization problem (5.35) 
corresponding to a fixed penalty parameter µ . Figure 5.4 shows the performance of 
the simulated annealing procedure in solving the sub-problem (5.35) with 50µ = µ β . It 
clearly demonstrates the convergence trend of the simulated annealing procedure in 
solving the linearly constrained maximization problem (5.35). 
 


























Figure 5.4 Convergence trend of the simulated annealing procedure in solving linearly 
constrained maximization problem (5.35) with parameter µ=µ0β5 
 
Demand stochasticity has impact on the maximum expected value of the after-tax 
profit. It can be described by the standard deviation of the normal distribution shown 
in Table 5.21. In this presentation, four sets of standard deviation shown in Tables 
5.21-5.24 were applied to the numerical example. Figure 5.5 shows that the maximum 
after-tax profit increases as the standard deviation increase.  
 
Table 5.22 Scenario 2 of standard deviation of normal distribution for the stochastic 
demand in each sub-period at each demand market 
       Demand market 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 45 47 45 44 48 
2 35 34 33 38 36 
3 57 56 55 58 56 
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Table 5.23 Scenario 3 of standard deviation of normal distribution for the stochastic 
demand in each sub-period at each demand market 
       Demand market 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 50 52 50 49 53 
2 40 39 38 43 41 
3 62 61 60 63 61 
4 31 32 33 30 29 
 
Table 5.24 Scenario 4 of standard deviation of normal distribution for the stochastic 
demand in each sub-period at each demand market 
       Demand market 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 55 57 55 54 58 
2 45 44 43 48 46 
3 67 66 65 68 66 
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Figure 5.5 Changes of maximum expected value of after-tax profit with respect to 
four scenarios of standard deviation 
 CHAPTER 5 MULTIPERIOD PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION PLANNING 
 108
Different confidence levels, each of which applies to all DCs are applied, to 
examine the impact of the chance constraints defined by equations (5.31) on the 
model. Figure 5.6 shows that the maximum expected after-tax profit value increases 







































Figure 5.6 Changes of maximum expected value of after-tax profit with respect to 
different confidence levels 
 
To numerically test the performance of the heuristic method proposed in section 4, 
10 numerical examples are generated, whose values of parameters are in twenty 
percent difference with the values showed in Tables 5.1-5.21. Table 5.25 shows the 
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Table 5.25 Computational time of the randomly generated numerical examples 












5.6 Discussion and Summary  
This chapter has developed a chance constrained programming model for a 
multination production-distribution planning for an MNC with consideration of 
transfer pricing and demand uncertainty. Maximization of the expected after-tax profit 
in the objective includes these decision variables: the order of raw materials for each 
plant, the inventory of both raw materials and products in each plant, the shipment of 
the products from each plant to each DC, the production of each plant and the transfer 
price charged by each plant, for all sub-periods. The proposed model can more or less 
help an MNC to plan his global supply chain.  
To solve the model, this chapter has proposed a heuristic method that is a penalty 
function method embedded with the simulated annealing procedure that employs 
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Phrase I of the simplex method to perform the Metropolis Monte Carlo simulation. 
Numerical results not only demonstrate efficiency of the proposed heuristics method, 
but also analyze impacts of the stochastic demand and chance constraints on the 
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CHAPTER 6 GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL FOR 
DECENTRALIZED GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
6.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the research is conducted on a global supply chain design 
problem with consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty for an MNC. 
In this chapter, the research is moved to the competition of MNCs that are producing 
substitutable products and hence compete with each other with consideration of 
transfer pricing, allocation of transportation cost and gradual tax brackets for each 
MNC.   
6.2 Problem Statement and Assumptions  
Assume that a number of MNCs producing and selling substitutable products 
compete with each other worldwide via their respective two-echelon global supply 
chains comprising plants and DCs. These two-echelon global supply chains with 
market competition are referred to as the decentralized global supply chain. In each 
individual two-echelon global supply chain owned by an MNC, plants produce or 
assemble a product and DCs purchase the product from the plants and sell them to 
consumers. To maximize after-tax profit, each MNC involved in the decentralized 
global supply chains seek an optimal plan of production, distribution, pricing and 
transportation cost allocation, which consists of quantity of the product produced at a 
plant, price of the product quoted by a DC, transfer price, and the shipment of the 
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product and transportation cost allocation between a plant and a DC. It is interested in 
characterizing and finding an equilibrium solution in terms of the production-
distribution, pricing and transportation cost allocation plan for each MNC involved in 
the decentralized global supply chain by assuming that all the MNCs which are 
incentive to maximize their own after-tax profit compete each other without 
cooperation.  
Given a two-echelon global supply chain owned by an MNC, it is assumed that 
each DC in the global supply chain buys the product from only one plant. Such an 
assumption is known as the single-sourcing strategy and has been used by Huang et al. 
(2005) and Romeijn et al. (2007). Since the currency exchange rate, import duty rate 
and income tax rate, transfer price, called the international economic parameters, vary 
over different countries, they should be thus taken into account by each MNC in 
making the optimal the production, distribution, pricing and transportation cost 
allocation plan for maximizing the after-tax profit. More interestingly, the MNC is 
able to coordinate transportation cost allocation between its plants and DCs to reduce 
tax paid because these plants and DCs belong to the same MNC. 
 Because corporate income tax rates of a country are usually comprised by several 
brackets, these tax brackets are numbered by consecutive integers starting from 
number 1, namely, { }1, 2,..., , and assume that the larger the tax bracket number is, the 
bigger the income tax rate will be. It is further assumed that demand for the product at 
a DC owned by an MNC is a function of selling prices quoted by those DCs located in 
the same country or territory in the decentralized global supply chain. 
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The following is notation that will be used throughout this chapter, including 
indices, sets, parameters and decision variables.  
Sets and indices  
{ }1, 2,...,C  Set of MNCs involved in the decentralized global supply chains, 
indexed by c , where C  is total number of the MNCs. 
M  Set of countries where plants in the decentralized global supply 
chain are located, indexed by m . 
N   Set of countries where DCs in the decentralized global supply 
chain are located, indexed by n . 
c
mP                           Set of plants owned by MNC c  and located in country m M∈ , 
indexed by i .  
ci
nmW              Set of DCs owned by MNC c , located in country n N∈  and 
purchasing the product from plant cmi P∈ , indexed by j . 
{ }1, 2, ,mS = "  Set of corporate income tax brackets of country m M∈ , 
indexed by s . 
{ }1,2, ,nS = "  Set of corporate income tax brackets of country n N∈ , indexed 
by sˆ . 
International economic parameters  
mnDUTY  Import duty rate on the value of product shipped from country 
m M∈  to country n N∈ .   
mE  Currency exchange rate of country m M∈  to US dollars [US 
dollars/monetary units of country m ].  
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nE  Currency exchange rate of country n N∈  to US dollars [US 
dollars/monetary units of country n ]. 
mTPR  Maximal transfer price perturbation range of product imposed 
by tax authority of country m M∈  [monetary units of country 
m M∈ ].  
s
mTAX  Income tax rate for bracket s  in country m M∈ . 
sˆ
nTAX  Income tax rate for bracket sˆ  in country n N∈ . 
s
mU  Upper bound of tax bracket ms S∈  in country m M∈  
[monetary units of country m M∈ ]. 
sˆ
nU  Upper bound of tax bracket ˆ ns S∈  in country n N∈  [monetary 
units of country n N∈ ]. 
Costs, production capacity and demand function associated with MNC c C∈   
c
iCA  Production capacity of plant i  owned by MNC c  [unit of 
product]. 
c
iPC   Unit production cost of the product produced in plant i  of 
MNC c  [monetary units of the country where plant i  is 
located/ unit of product]. 
c
ijTC   Unit transportation cost excluding import duty of product 
shipped from plant i  of MNC c  to DC j  of MNC 
c [monetary units of the country where plant i  is located /unit 
of product]. 
( ),c c cj j nD z −z  Demand function for product at DC j  located in country 
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n N∈ , owned by MNC c , where cjz  is selling price of the 
product quoted by DC j  located in country n N∈ , and cn−z  is 
a row vector of all the selling prices of the product quoted by 
those DCs located in country n  but owned by the other MNCs, 
namely,  
 { }, , 1, 2, , 1, 1,...,c k ki kn j nm mz j W i P k c c C− = ∈ ∈ = − +z " . 
Decision variables associated with MNC c C∈   
c
ijx  Amount of product, produced in plant i  of MNC c  and 
supplied to DC j  of MNC c  [amount of unit of product].  
c
ijy  Transfer price charged by plant i  of MNC c  for product 
supplied to DC j  of MNC c  [US dollars/unit of product]. 
c
jz  Selling price of product quoted by DC j  of MNC c  
[monetary units of the country where DC j  is located /unit of 
product]. 
c
ijα  Fraction of transportation cost allocated to plant i  of MNC c  
for transporting product from plant i  of MNC c  to DC j  of 
MNC c . 
In relation to the incorporate income tax rates, without loss of generality, it is 
assumed that 
 0 0 1 10; 0;  ; , ,s s s sm m m m m m mTAX U TAX TAX U U s S m M
− −= = ≤ ≤ ∈ ∈  (6.1) 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 0 1 1 ˆ0; 0;  ; , ,s s s sn n n n n n nTAX U TAX TAX U U s S n M
− −= = ≤ ≤ ∈ ∈  (6.2) 
Eqns. (6.1)-(6.2) reflect the stepwise corporate income rate. For any DC j  owned by 
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MNC c , it is assumed that demand function for the product has the partial linear 
expression: 
 ( ) ( ),c c c c c c c cj j n j j j j nD z a b z f− −= − +z z  (6.3) 
where cja  and 
c
jb  are two nonnegative parameters, and ( )c cj nf −z  is assumed to be a 
continuous differentiable function with respect to vector cn
−z . It should be pointed out 
that the price-sensitive linear demand function has been postulated by many game 
theoretical applications in domestic supply chain management (Corbett and 
Karmarker, 2001; Leng and Parlar, 2005). Our partial linear demand function defined 
by eqn. (6.3) is obviously more generic than those linear demand functions used in the 
literature.      
6.3 Two Maximization Models to Characterize Behavior of an Individual MNC in 
Maximization of his After-profit  
Let cµ  be a row vector of all the decision variables defining a feasible plan of 
production, distribution, pricing and transportation cost allocation for MNC 
{ }1, 2, ,c C∈ " , namely, 
 ( ), , , , , , ,c c c c c c ciij ij j ij m nmx y z i P j W m M n N= α ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈µ  (6.4) 
Given a row vector cµ , revenues of MNC c  in terms of US dollars gained from plant 
i  and DC j  can be expressed by two functions of decision variable cµ , respectively:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
ci
nm
c c c c c c c c c c
i ij ij m i ij ij ij ij m
n N j W
x y E PC x TC x i P m M
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤Ψ = × − × × +α × × ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦∑ ∑µ  (6.5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
                   1 , , , ,
c c c c c c
j n j ij mn ij ij
c c c c ci
m ij ij ij m nm
E z x DUTY x y
E TC x i P j W n N m M
⎡ ⎤Ψ = × × − + × ×⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− × −α × × ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦
µ
 (6.6) 
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Eqn. (6.5) indicates that revenue generated by a plant of MNC c  amounts to the 
income from selling the product to all the DCs less the sum of the production cost and 
the allocated transportation cost. Eqn. (6.6) implies that revenue yielded by a DC of 
MNC c  is equal to the income from selling the product to consumers minus expense 
in purchasing the product from a plant and the relevant transportation cost allocated to 
the DC. 
Identifying the optimal plan of production, distribution, pricing and transportation 
cost allocation to maximize the after-profit for MNC c  can be mathematically 
formulated by the nonlinearly constrained maximization model with decision 
variables cµ , dummy variables cπ  and parameter c−z : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )











c c c c c s cs
c i m m i
m M s Si P
c c s cs
j n n j






⎡ ⎤= Ψ − × ×π⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦








 ( ) , ,
m
c c cs c
i m i m
s S
E i P m M
∈
Ψ ≤ × π ∈ ∈∑µ  (6.8) 
 ( ) ˆ
ˆ
, , , ,
n
c c cs c ci
j n j m nm
s S
E i P j W m M n N
∈
Ψ ≤ × π ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈∑µ  (6.9) 
 1, , ,cs s s ci m m m mU U i P m M s S
−π ≤ − ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.10) 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ, , , , ,cs s s ci cj n n nm m nU U j W i P m M n N s S
−π ≤ − ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.11) 






n N j W
x CA i P m M
∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈∑ ∑  (6.13) 
 ( ) , , , ,c c c c c c ci cij j j j j n nm mx a b z f j W i P m M n N−≤ − + ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈z  (6.14) 
 0 1, , , ,c c ciij m nmi P j W m M n N≤ α ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.15) 
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 , , 0, , , ,c c c c ciij ij j m nmx y z i P j W m M n N≥ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.16) 
 0, , ,csi m mi P m M s Sπ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.17) 
 ˆ ˆ0, , , , ,cs ci cj nm m nj W i P m M n N s Sπ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.18) 
where the row vector ( ),c cn n N− −= ∈z z , and the row vector of all the dummy 
variables: 
 ( )ˆ ˆ, , , , , , ,c cs cs c cii j m nm m ni P j W s S s S m M n N= π π ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈π  (6.19) 
The dummy variables in the bracket of right hand side of eqn. (6.19) play a role 
in converting the stepwise income tax rates, shown in eqns. (6.1)-(6.2), into two 
continuous differentiable parts defining the total after-tax profit of MNC c , shown in 
the right hand side of eqn. (6.7).  Eqn. (6.7) is the objective function that is to 
maximize the after-tax profit of MNC c . Eqns. (6.8) and (6.9) partition the incomes 
of plant i  and DC j  into two components ˆcsiπ  and ˆcsjπ  corresponding to the gradual 
income tax brackets of countries m  and n , respectively. Eqns. (6.10) and (6.11) 
imposes upper bounds on dummy decision variables csiπ  and ˆcsjπ . It can be seen that 
maximization of the objective function, together with constraints eqns. (6.8)-(6.10), 
guarantee the income tax paid following the gradual tax rates when a plant or a DC 
makes a positive income. Eqn. (6.12) imposes the bounds for transfer prices according 
to tax authorities’ regulation. This is because according to OECD international 
guidelines based on arm’s length principle, transfer prices are restricted in a certain 
range around the real market prices of a product. Eqn. (6.13) is the production 
capacity constraint for each plant. Eqn. (6.14) implies that the amount of the product 
purchased by DC j  does not exceed demand that DC j  faces. Eqn. (6.15) is a 
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straightforward constraint for the transportation cost allocation ratio between a plant 
and a DC. Eqns. (6.15)-(6.18) show nonnegativity of all the decision variables 
including the dummy variables. 
Given any fixed value of parameter c−z , it can be seen that model (6.7)-(6.18) is 
a nonlinear and non-concave maximization problem with respect to variables cµ  and 
cπ  because of these three terms, c cij ijy x , 
c c
ij ijxα  and c cj ijz x , involved in revenue functions 
( )c ciΨ µ  and ( )c cjΨ µ . Fortunately, a simple but useful mathematical transformation 
technique can be employed for the above non-concave maximization model to yield a 
concave maximization formulation. To do so, three groups of new variables are 
defined as follows: 
 , , , ,c c c c ciij ij ij m nmx y i P j W m M n Nη = × ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.20) 
 , , , ,c c c c ciij ij ij m nmv x i P j W m M n N= α × ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.21) 
 , , , ,c c c c ciij j ij m nmz x i P j W m M n Nγ = × ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.22) 
Let cλ  be a row vector of all the new variables and the distribution variables { }cijx , 
namely,  
 ( ), , , , , , ,c c c c c c ciij ij ij ij m nmx i P j W m M n N= η ν γ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈λ  (6.23) 
In terms of vector cλ , two revenue functions shown in eqns. (6.5)-(6.6) can be 
rewritten by 
 ( ) ( ) , ,
ci
nm
c c c c c c c c
i ij m i ij ij ij m
n N j W
E PC x TC i P m M
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤Ψ = η − × × + ×ν ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦∑ ∑λ  (6.24) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
               , , , ,
c c c c
j n ij mn ij
c c c c ci c
m ij ij m ij ij nm m
E DUTY
E TC x E TC j W i P n N m M
⎡ ⎤Ψ = × γ − + ×η⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− × × − × ×ν ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦
λ
 (6.25) 
According to Eqns. (6.24)-(6.25), it can be seen that functions ( )c cPiΨ λ  and 
( )c cDCjΨ λ  both are linear functions of vector cλ . In terms of variable cλ , dummy 
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variable csπ , and parameters c−x  and c−γ , model (6.7)-(6.15) can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ˆ ˆ
ˆ
max , , ,





c cs c c c c s cs
c i m m i
m M s Si P
c c s cs
j n n j






⎛ ⎞= Ψ − × ×π⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ Ψ − × ×π⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑




 ( ) , ,
m
c c cs c
i m i m
s S
E i P m M
∈
Ψ ≤ × π ∈ ∈∑λ  (6.27) 
 ( ) ˆ
ˆ
, , , ,
n
c c cs ci c
j n j nm m
s S
E j W i P m M n N
∈
Ψ ≤ × π ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈∑λ  (6.28) 
 1, , ,cs s s ci m m m mU U i P m M s S
−π ≤ − ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.29) 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ, , , , ,cs s s ci cj n n nm m nU U j W i P m M n N s S
−π ≤ − ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.30) 







n N j W
x CA i P m M
∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈∑ ∑  (6.32) 
 ( ) ( )2 , 0, , , ,c c c c c c c c c ci cij j ij j ij ij j n n nm mx a x b x f j W i P m M n N− −− + γ − ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈γ x  (6.33) 
 0 , , , ,c c ci cij ij nm mv x j W i P m M n N≤ ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.34) 
 , , 0, , , ,c c c c ciij ij ij m nmx i P j W m M n Nη γ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.35) 
 0, , ,csi m mi P m M s Sπ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.36) 
 ˆ ˆ0, , , , ,cs ci cj nm m nj W i P m M n N s Sπ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈  (6.37) 
where the four row vectors associated with the other MNCs are: 
 ( ), , , , 1, 2, , 1, 1, ,c k k ki kn ij j nm mx z j W i P m M k c c C− = ∈ ∈ ∈ = − +γ " "  (6.38) 
  ( ), , , , 1, 2, 1, 1, ,c k ki kn ij nm mx j W i P m M k c c C− = ∈ ∈ ∈ = − +x " "  (6.39) 
 ( ),c cn n N− −= ∈γ γ  (6.40) 
 ( ),c cn n N− −= ∈x x  (6.41) 
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It can be seen that constraints (6.31), (6.33) and (6.34) are derived by multiplying 
c
ijx  for both sides of constraints (6.12), (6.14) and (6.15), respectively, due to 
nonnegativity of multiplier cijx . As the left hand side of eqn. (6.33) is a convex 
function with respect to variable cλ , model (6.26)-(6.37) is hence a concave 
maximization problem with respect to variables cλ  and csπ , which can be effectively 
solved by several solution algorithms in nonlinear program. In addition, eqns. (6.20)-
(6.22) implies the following proposition.  
Proposition 6.1. Non-concave maximization model (6.7)-(6.18) and concave 
maximization model (6.26)-(6.37) are equivalent in the optimal solution and objective 
function value. 
6.4 Generalized Nash Game Model  
As the decentralized global supply chain consists of C  MNCs producing 
substitutable products, these MNCs hence compete with each other without any 
cooperation in order to maximize their respective after-tax profit. This non-
cooperative competition problem can be formulated by a generalized Nash game 
model. In terms of terminology used in game theory, each MNC is also regarded as a 
player whose behavior is described by either model (6.7)-(6.18) or model (6.26)-
(6.37). Here model (6.26)-(6.37) is preferred due to its favorable concavity with 
efficient optimization solvers. As a result, the payoff function and strategy set of 
MNC (or player) { }1, 2, ,c C∈ "  are the objective function shown in eqn. (6.26) and 
the feasible solution set defined by constraints (6.27)-(6.37), respectively.  
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To emphasize a strategy of a specified MNC { }1, 2, ,c C∈ " , let us define three 
row vectors: 
 ( ), , 1, 2, ,c c c c C= =ξ λ π "  (6.42) 
 ( )1 2 1 1, , , , , , , 1, 2, ,c c c C c C− − += =ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ" " "  (6.43) 
 ( ),c c−=ξ ξ ξ  (6.44) 
Vector cξ  denotes a strategy (or a feasible solution) of player c  (or MNC c ); vector 
c−ξ  subsumes all the other MNCs’ strategies except MNC c ; vector ξ  is a joint 
strategy of all the MNC. Given a fixed vector c−ξ , the rivals’ strategies of MNC c , let 
( )cc −Ω ξ  be the set of all strategies of MNC c , namely,  
 ( ) { } satisfies constraints (6.27)-(6.37) , 1, 2,...,c c c c C−Ω = =ξ ξ ξ  (6.45) 
( )c−Ω ξ  is the feasible solution set of the concave maximization model (6.26)-(6.37) 
associated with parameter c−ξ . Therefore, ( )c−Ω ξ  is a compact and convex set in the 
space 
cℜ ξ , where cξ  denotes dimension of vector cξ . Let Ω  be the set of all joint 
strategies for all the MNCs, namely, 
( ){ },  satisfies constraints (6.27)-(6.37) for each MNC 1,2, ,  c c c C−Ω = = =ξ ξ ξ ξ "
 (6.46) 
The above set Ω  is no longer convex in the space ℜ ξ , where ξ  denotes dimension 
of vector ξ , because the left hand side of constraint (6.33) is a non-convex function in 
variable ξ .  
Given a joint strategy ξ , let ( )Ω ξ  be Cartesian product of the corresponding 
strategy set shown in eqn. (6.45) of each MNC, namely,  
 ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 C− −Ω = Ω × ×Ωξ ξ ξ"  (6.47) 
Assuming that each MNC { }1, 2,...,c C∈  follows passive perception, the game-
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theoretical model to characterize the equilibrium solution of the decentralized global 
supply chain can be formulated as follows: 
Find a vector ( ) ( )* *,1 *,2 *, *, 1 *, *, , , , , ,c c C+= ∈Ωξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ" "  such that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) { }*, *, *, *,, , ,  for each player 1, 2,...,c c c c c cc cF F c C− − −≥ ∀ ∈Ω ∈ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ  (6.48) 
where payoff function ( ),cF ⋅ ⋅  is the objective function shown in eqn. (6.26).   
Eqn. (6.48) reflects an equilibrium situation that no MNC can increase its after-
profit by unilaterally changing its own strategy compared to the joint strategy *ξ . 
According to taxonomy of games (Harker, 1991), model (6.48) is nominated as the 
generalized Nash game, and any of its solution is called the generalized Nash 
equilibrium solution. With regarding to a specific MNC c , its strategy set ( )c−Ω ξ  is a 
non-empty, closed and convex set for any given c−ξ . In addition, payoff function 
( ),c ccF −ξ ξ  is continuous in variable ξ  and concave in variable cξ . Theorem 12.3 of 
Aubin (1998) guarantees the existence of a solution to the generalized Nash game 
model (6.48), namely: 
Proposition 6.2. The generalized Nash game model (6.48) possesses at least one 
solution. 
It should be pointed out that the solution to the generalized Nash game model 
(6.48) may not be unique. Uniqueness of the generalized Nash equilibrium solution 
needs very strong conditions on the payoff function and joint strategy set (Aubin, 
1998).    
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6.5 Two Heuristic Methods 
Compare to a normal Nash game, it is more challenging to develop an efficient 
and convergent solution method for solving a generalized Nash game model. This is 
because the strategy set of each player depends on the other players’ strategies; see 
strategy set ( )c−Ω ξ  of player c  shown in eqn. (6.48). Up to now, operations research 
scholars have contributed two sorts of approaches for solving a generalized Nash 
game model: quasi-variational inequality and optimization formulation. Since a 
generalized Nash game model can be reformulated as a quasi-variational inequality 
(Harker, 1991), Chan and Pang (1982) and Pang and Fukushima (2005) proposed a 
projection method and a penalty function method for solving the induced quasi-
variational inequality, respectively. These two solution methods are conceptual with 
computational difficulty in implementation even for small problems. More recently, 
Heusinger and Kanzow (2006) and Fukushima (2006) transformed a generalized Nash 
game model into an optimization formulation by making use of Nikaido-Isoda type 
function (Nikaido and Isoda, 1955), which allows us to employ any solution method 
solving optimization problems to find a generalized Nash equilibrium solution. Notice 
that Nikaido-Isoda function based solution methods have been employed to solve the 
normal Nash game models (Uryasev and Rubinstein, 1994; Krawczyk and Uryasev, 
2000). However, all these solution methods need a fundamental assumption that the 
full Cartesian product of the strategy sets of a generalized Nash game model is convex; 
otherwise these methods are inapplicable. Unfortunately, the full Cartesian product of 
the strategy sets for the generalized Nash game model (6.48), namely, set Ω  defined 
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by eqn. (6.46), is a non-convex set. In other words, it is necessary to seek heuristic 
methods to find an equilibrium solution of model (6.48).  
Given a fixed vector c−ξ , strategies of the other MNCs, the optimal strategy of 
MNC c  corresponding to c−ξ  can be obtained easily by solving the parameterized 
concave maximization model (6.26)-(6.37). Such a property enables us to seek an 
iterative solution method that needs to solve the concave maximization model (6.26)-
(6.37) at each iteration. Inspired by the solution methods solving the normal Nash 
game model of Basar (1987), two heuristic methods are come out as follows. 
Gauss-Seidel Iterative Method 
Step 0: (Initiation) Choose an initial joint strategy ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 00 1 ,..., C= ∈Ωξ ξ ξ , and let the 
number of iterations : 0k =  and the number of players examined : 0c =  
Step 1: (Solve the concave maximization for MNC c ) Let : 1c c= + , and find optimal 
solution 
( )1kc +ξ  that solves the concave maximization model (6.26)-(6.37) 
associated with given parameter 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1,..., , ,...,k k k kc c C− +ξ ξ ξ ξ .  
Step 2: (Check the number of MNCs that have been examined) If c C< , go to Step 1. 
Otherwise, go to step 3. 
Step 3: (Check a stop criterion) If 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11,2,...,max , ,k k k kc c c cc cc C F F+ +− −= − ≤ εξ ξ ξ ξ , then 
stop, where ε  is a predetermined stop tolerance; otherwise, set : 1k k= + , 
: 0c =  and go to step 1.  
In the above Gauss-Seidel iterative method, Steps 1-2 simulates the decision 
procedure of a MNC that acts on the other MNCs’ strategies made in the last iteration. 
It can be easily checked that ( )1k+ξ  is a generalized Nash equilibrium solution if  
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11,2,...,max , , 0k k k kc c c cc cc C F F+ +− −= − =ξ ξ ξ ξ  (6.49) 
In other words, the stop criterion of Step 3 is applicable. As an alternative, Steps 1-2 
can be replaced with another computational process that assumes that the MNCs take 
their turns sequentially and act on the latest updated information obtained from the 
other MNCs, which leads to the second heuristic method: 
Cournot Iterative Method 
Step 0: (Initiation) Choose an initial joint strategy ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 00 1 ,..., C= ∈Ωξ ξ ξ , and let the 
number of iterations : 0k =  and the number of players examined : 0c =  
Step 1: (Solve a concave maximization model of player c ) Let : 1c c= + , and find 
optimal solution 
( )1kc +ξ  that solves the concave maximization model (6.26)-
(6.37) associated with given parameter 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 1 1,..., , ,...,k k k kc c C+ +− +ξ ξ ξ ξ .  
Step 2: (Check the number of MNCs that have been examined) If c C< , go to Step 1. 
Otherwise, go to step 3. 
Step 3: (Check a stop criterion) If 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11,2,...,max , ,k k k kc c c cc cc C F F+ +− −= − ≤ εξ ξ ξ ξ , then 
stop, where ε  is a predetermined stop tolerance; otherwise, set : 1k k= + , 
: 0c =  and go to step 1.  
Compared the two heuristic methods presented above, difference only lies in the 
parameters defining the concave maximization model of Step 1. The latter heuristic 
method uses parameter 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 1 1,..., , ,...,k k k kc c C+ +− +ξ ξ ξ ξ  that includes the latest updated 
decisions 
( ) ( )1 11 1,...,
k kc+ +−ξ ξ  made by MNCs from number 1 to number 1c − .  
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6.6 Numerical Examples 
To evaluate the generalized Nash game model (6.48) and assess two heuristic 
methods presented above, several illustrative numerical examples are used of the 
decentralized global supply chain. Two heuristic methods - Gauss-Seidel and Cournot 
iterative methods - are coded by Version 7.0 of Matlab, and both are run on a Desktop 
computer with CPU of Intel P4 3.00GHZ and RAM of 512M. The relevant concave 
maximization model (6.26)-(6.37) in Step 1 of these two heuristic methods is solved 
by optimization solver “fmincon” of Matlab. Moreover, the stop tolerance 610−ε =  is 
applied for all the numerical examples. 
6.6.1 An example with two MNCs 
To evaluate impact of currency exchange rate, income tax bracket and 
transportation allocation on the generalized Nash equilibrium solution, a numerical 
example of the decentralized global supply chain with two MNCs producing 
substitutable products as shown in Figure 6.1 is developed.  









Figure 6.1 A decentralized global supply chain with two MNCs 
 
It is assumed that the two-echelon global supply chain of MNC 1 comprises plant 
P1 and DC D1 and the two-echelon global supply chain of MNC 2 consists of plant 
P2 and DC D2.  Plants P1 and P2 are located in Countries 1 and 2, respectively, while 
DCs D1 and D2 are both located in Country 3. It is further assumed that DCs D1 and 
D2 serve the same demand market.  
 
Table 6.1 Currency exchange rate to US$ of each country 
Country 1 2 3 
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Table 6.2 Income tax brackets with different tax rates for each country 
Income tax bracket 
( 510  monetary units of 
Country 1) 
(0, 8] (8,16] (16,24] (24,+∞ ) Country 
1 
Income tax rate 0.2 0.25 0.30 0.35 
Income tax bracket 
( 510  monetary units of 
Country 2) 
(0,3] (3,6] (6,9] (9,+∞ ) Country 
2 
Income tax rate 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 
Income tax bracket 
( 510  monetary units of 
Country 3) 
(0,1] (1,2] (2,3] (3,+∞ ) Country 
3 
Income tax rate 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
 




Country 1 0.20 
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Table 6.4 Unit production cost, unit transportation cost and production capacity for 




cost ( ciPC ) 
Unit transportation 
cost ( cijTC )  
Production 
capacity ( ciCP )  
Plant 1 1000 30 2000 
Plant 2 520 15 2000 
 




Country 1 Country 2 
mTPR (US$) 100 150 
 
For each country, currency exchange rate and 4 income tax brackets with the 
relevant tax rates are tabulated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Table 6.3 gives the 
import duty rates from Country 1 to Country 3 and from Country 2 to Country 3. 
Table 6.4 shows the unit production cost, the unit transportation cost and the 
production capacity for each plant; Table 6.5 lists the maximum transfer price 
perturbation range imposed by tax authority of each country. It is further assumed that 
the demand functions of two DCs have the following expressions: 
 ( )1 2 1 21 1 2 1 2, 1000 2 1.5D z z z z= − +  (6.50) 
 ( )1 2 2 12 1 2 2 1, 1200 2 1.5D z z z z= − +  (6.51) 
6.6.1.1 Impact of currency exchange rate 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 respectively depict changes of the after-tax profits and market 
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prices of the product at the generalized Nash equilibrium solution, obtained by either 
of the two heuristic methods, with respect to different currency exchange rates of 
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Figure 6.3 Impact of currency exchange rate of Country 1 on the market price of 
product 
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From Figure 6.2, it can be seen that the after-tax profit of MNC 1 declines with 
increase in currency exchange rate of Country 1 while the after-tax profit of MNC 2 
increases. As shown in Figure 6.3, both market prices of the product quoted by MNCs 
1 and 2 increases with currency exchange rate of Country 1.  
Results shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 can be collaborated as follows. With 
increasing currency change rate of Country 1 where plant of MNC 1 is located, the 
production cost in raw material purchase and transportation cost of MNC 1 will be 
also be driven upwards. Hence in order to cover the increased cost, DC 1 of MNC 1 
may tend to increase the market price of its product. This action will lead to a 
decrease in the demand faced by DC1 due to the market competition with MNC 2. As 
a result, the resulting after-tax profit of MNC 1 decreases because the increase in price 
is unable to cover the lost incurred from the decrease in demand. On the other hand, 
demand faced by DC 2 will increase due to increase of the market price of the product 
from DC 1. Accordingly, upon seeing this potential, MNC 2 will tend to increase its 
market price to obtain more after-tax profit. Therefore, the after-tax profit of MNC 2 
increases.   
6.6.1.2 Impact of income tax rates  
To investigate impact of income tax rate on the transfer price and transportation 
allocation, three sets of income tax rates of Country 3, shown in Table 6.6, are used. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates change of transfer prices charged by Plants P1 and P2 with 
respect to the three sets of tax rates. By looking at Figure 6.4, it can be observed that 
both transfer prices increase with increase of tax rates of Country 3. This is because 
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when Country 3 (where two DCs are located) increases its income tax rates, each 
MNC will increase its transfer prices to shift their profits from DCs to plants in order 
to reduce the income tax paid in Country 3.  
 
Table 6.6 Three sets of income tax brackets with different income tax rates for 
Country 3 
   Tax brackets ( 510 monetary units of 
Country 3)
Set number of income tax rates 
(0,1] (1,2] (2,3] (3,+∞ ) 
Set 1  0.20 0.25 0.3 0.35 
Set 2  0.30 0.35 0.4 0.45 









Set 1 Set 2 Set 3














Figure 6.4 Impact of tax rates of Country 3 on transfer prices 
 
Table 6.7 shows the transportation cost allocation ratios assigned to each plant 
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with respect to the three set of income tax rates of Country 3 listed in Table 6.6. 
According to this table, MNC 1 will allocate all transportation cost to its DC D1 when 
the income tax rate of Country 3 increases to Set 3. This is because such an allocation 
can reduce the income tax paid in Country 3. In other words, MNC 1 can gain more 
after-tax profit by coordinating transportation allocation between its plants and DCs. 
 
Table 6.7 Transportation cost allocation ratios ( )ijα  for the two plants 
    Plants 
 
Set number of income tax rates 
P1 P2 
Set 1 1.0 1.0 
Set 2 1.0 1.0 
Set 3 0 1.0 
 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 give three sets of income tax rates of Countries 1 and 2, 
respectively. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 plot transfer prices charged by Plants P1 and P2 with 
respect two scenarios of income tax rates shown in Tables 6.8 and 6.9, respectively. 
According to these two figures, it can be clearly seen that transfer price charged by a 
plant decrease with increase of the income tax rates of the country where the plant 
located in. These two figures also shows that change of tax rate of one country will 
not only affect the transfer price of plants located in the country, but also affect 
transfer prices of plants located in other countries due to the competition. In addition, 
the impact on the transfer prices of plants located in other countries is not as much as 
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the impact on the transfer prices of plant located in the country where the tax rates 
change.  
 
Table 6.8 Three sets of income tax brackets with different income tax rates for 
Country 1 
   Tax brackets ( 510  monetary units of 
Country 1)
 
Set number of income tax rates 
(0, 8] (8,16] (16,24] (24,+∞ ) 
Set 1  0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 
Set 2  0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 
Set 3  0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 
 
Table 6.9 Three sets of income tax brackets with different income tax rates for 
Country 2 
   Tax brackets( 510  monetary units of 
country 2)
 
Set number of income tax rates 
(0,3] (3,6] (6,9] (9,+∞ ) 
Set 1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 
Set 2  0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 
Set 3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
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Figure 6.6 Impact of tax rates of Country 2 on transfer prices 
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6.6.2 Performance of two heuristic methods  
Two scenarios of the decentralized global supply chain, shown in Table 6.10 was 
designed to numerically evaluate the performance of two heuristic methods. Scenario 
A consists of the decentralized global supply chain with a network structure shown in 
Figure 6.1. It is further assumed that each Country imposes 4 income tax brackets 
with different income tax rates and that the demand function takes the linear form like 
the one shown in eqn. (6.50) or (6.51). 
 




Number of MNCs 2 5 
Number of plants of each MNC 1 2 
Number of DCs of each MNC 1 5 
Number of decision variables for 
each MNC   
14 48 
































































Figure 6.7 The decentralized supply chain of Scenario B 
 
Regarding Scenario B, Figure 6.7 depicts the network structure of the 
decentralized global supply chain, which involves 5 MNCs and each MNC owns 2 
plants and 5 DCs. More specifically, the two-echelon global supply chain of MNC 1 
consists of plants P1, P2 and DCs D1 to D5; the two-echelon global supply chain of 
MNC 2 possesses plants P3, P4 and DCs D6 to D10; the two-echelon supply chain of 
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MNC 3 comprises plants P5, P6 and DCs D11 to D15; the two-echelon global supply 
chain of MNC 4 has plants P7, P8 and DCs D16 to D20; the two-echelon global 
supply chain of MNC 5 includes plants P9, P10 and DCs D21 to D25. Countries 
where these plants and DCs are located are shown in Figure 6.7. In addition, it is 
assumed that each country imposes 4 income tax brackets with different income tax 
rates. The demand function of a DC takes the following expression: 
 
( ) 1 2 3
, 1 ,
,  




c c c c c
j j n j j
c c c j W i P
ci c
nm m
D z a a z a z




′ ′≠ = ′ ′ ′∈ ∈
= − × + ×
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∑ ∑z
 (6.52) 
where 1a  is real number in the interval [ ]2000,3000 ; 2a  is a real number in the 
interval [ ]3.0,4.0 ; 3a  is a real number in the interval [ ]0.8,1.1 .  
For each scenario, values of those parameters involved in the concave 
maximization model (6.26)-(6.37) within the corresponding interval to yield 10 
examples are generated.  Fortunately, both of the two heuristic methods can find a 
solution for each of these twenty numerical examples. CPU time and the number of 
iterations used by these two heuristic methods are summarized in Tables 6.11 and 6.12, 
respectively. These two tables clearly indicate that the CPU time used by either of the 
two heuristic methods depends on the problem size. Finally, it is emphasized again 
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1 25 14 1 1093 7 
2 30 13 2 1138 7 
3 33 15 3 1291 8 
4 18 11 4 4925 23 
5 21 12 5 4503 23 
6 28 13 6 2627 17 
7 43 26 7 2883 17 
8 19 16 8 2635 14 
9 38 22 9 2010 10 
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1 22 13 1 1533 10 
2 20 11 2 1631 12 
3 35 17 3 1288 9 
4 39 20 4 1649 13 
5 30 15 5 4435 26 
6 28 14 6 3012 19 
7 53 28 7 2833 21 
8 33 18 8 2001 15 
9 42 21 9 1732 13 
10 44 21 10 1305 9 
 
6.7 Discussion and Summary 
In this chapter a generalized Nash game model is proposed to investigate the 
equilibrium solution in terms of production, distribution, pricing and transportation 
cost allocation plan for each MNC involved in the decentralized global supply chain. 
After demonstrating existence of the generalized Nash equilibrium solution, two 
heuristic methods are employed to find an equilibrium solution, which need to solve a 
concave maximization model that reflects the behavior of an individual MNC in 
maximizing his after-tax profit. An example with two MNCs is applied to show the 
impact of international features on the equilibrium solution of the game-theoretical 
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model proposed in this chapter. Moreover, twenty numerical examples randomly 
generated from two scenarios were carried out to numerically access the performance 
of two heuristic methods. As long as the demand function and other data is got, the 
proposed model in this chapter can help an MNC to anticipate his after-tax profit at 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUGURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, mathematical models and algorithms is developed for some issues 
in supply chain design and planning.  
The unconstrained minimization formulations for the SCNE models were 
successfully derived. They enable us to employ the quasi-Newton algorithm to obtain 
the SCNE solution. Compared to the modified projection method, quasi-Newton 
algorithm does not need to predetermine the step size since a line search at each 
iteration obtains an optimal step size. Furthermore, the numerical results showed that 
for most cases the computational time used by quasi-Newton algorithm is less than 
that used by the modified projection method.  
To reflect the production capacity constraints, the SCNE model with production 
capacity constraints was proposed. The numerical results showed that the outputs of 
equilibrium solutions with and without production capacity constraints are different, 
namely, the production capacity does affect the equilibrium solution of a decentralized 
supply chain.  
Subsequently, an MPEC model was developed for a competitive facility location 
problem by using the SCNE model with production capacity constraints as the 
equilibrium constraints to describe the economic equilibrium state of a supply chain. 
The results showed that the maximal profit and total expenditure of establishing 
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facilities increase as the budget for establishing facilities increase, and they will stop 
increasing as the budget is large enough. This interesting result means that an entering 
firm that wants to choose the location for opening its manufacturing facilities, 
opening more manufacturing facilities may not lead to more profit. This is because the 
competition exists among the newly opened and existing manufacturing facilities.  
Regarding global supply chain planning, a chance-constrained programming 
model was proposed for multiperiod production-distribution planning for an MNC 
with consideration of transfer pricing and demand uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis of 
the confidence level and the standard deviation of the demand were studied. The 
numerical results showed that the expected value of the after-tax profit increases as 
the confidence level of inventories at DCs decreases or the standard deviation of the 
demand increases.  
Finally, a generalized Nash game model was proposed for MNCs that produce 
substitutable products and compete with each other by considering transfer pricing, 
allocation of transportation cost and the gradual tax brackets for each MNC. Although 
20 numerical examples demonstrated the convergence of Gauss-Seidel Iterative 
Method and Cournot Iterative Method, the convergence of the solution algorithms is 
yet to be proven. Actually, the solution algorithm for solving generalized Nash game 
model is an open question. To the best of our knowledge, up to date there is no 
efficient algorithm whose convergence has been proven for the generalized Nash 
game whose joint strategy set is nonconvex. It is a potential research topic in supply 
chain design and planning.  
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7.2 Research Contribution 
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1. A comprehensive literature review of SCNE models, competitive facility 
location problems and global supply chain planning is provided. 
2. An alternative formulation and solution method are investigated for SCNE 
models (Nagurney et al., 2002; Dong, et al., 2004). More specifically, the VI 
formulations for the SCNE models is transformed to unconstrained 
minimization problems and hence the quasi-Newton algorithm can be applied 
to solve it. The solution method, quasi-Newton algorithm, overcomes the 
limitation that it is impossible to find a universal step size while 
implementing the modified projection method for solving the SCNE models.  
3. The SCNE model with production capacity constraints is developed. The 
modified projection method is unusable to solve this model because of the 
existence of capacity constraints. Therefore, the logarithmic-quadratic 
proximal prediction-correction (LQP P-C) method is investigated. A 
numerical example is applied to show the impact of production capacities of 
manufacturers on the equilibrium state of a supply chain. 
4. A novel and interesting research issue regarding the competitive facility 
location on decentralized supply chains is explored. More specifically, an 
MPEC model is proposed for a competitive facility location by applying the 
SCNE model with production capacity constraints to describe the economic 
equilibrium state of the decentralized supply chain. A hybrid Genetic 
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algorithm (GA) incorporated with LQP P-C method is developed for solving 
this model. This is the first time that an equilibrium model that can describe 
the economic equilibrium of a decentralized supply chain comprising 
manufacturers, retailers and demand markets is applied to in a competitive 
facility location problem.  
5. A chance-constrained programming model is built for the optimal 
production-distribution planning for an MNC with consideration of transfer 
pricing and demand uncertainty. A penalty function method incorporated with 
simulated annealing procedure is then presented for solving this model. This 
model would capture the fluctuation of currency exchange rates over a 
taxation period and the demand uncertainty, which have not been considered 
together with transfer pricing for an MNC so far.  
6. A generalized Nash game model is developed to analyze the competition of 
MNCs that produce substitutable products. This is the first game-theoretical 
model for analyzing the competition of MNCs, taking into account transfer 
pricing, allocation of transportation cost and graduate tax brackets. Two 
heuristic methods are investigated and numerically analyzed.   
7.3 Recommendation for Future Research 
This thesis has only investigated a few interesting issues in supply chain design 
and planning. There are still many opportunities for further study on it. Following are 
several recommendations for the future study: 
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1. The competitive facility location problem studied in Chapter 3 assumes 
that there is one entering firm. As an extension, the game theory can be 
employed to examine multiple entering firms.  
2. The currency exchange rate is one of the most important international 
features in global supply chain. In practice, currency exchange rates of 
different countries are dependent. With taking into consideration of 
dependent currency exchange rates, a novel research topic on global 
supply chain planning will be emerged. To our best knowledge, it has not 
been examined up to now.  
3. The game-theoretical model proposed in Chapter 6 is actually a 
generalized Nash equilibrium problem. Up to date, algorithms for solving 
generalized Nash equilibrium problem are restricted in some kinds of 
special cases. Future research can be conducted on evolving efficient 
algorithms to solve the generalized Nash equilibrium problems.  
4. The game-theoretical model proposed in Chapter 6 assumes that the 
market demand is deterministic. Hence, a model to study the Nash game 
of multiple MNCs that are facing random demand can be developed in the 
future.  
Overall, the research in this thesis is a significant step of further understanding of 
mathematical models and algorithms for supply chain design and planning. It may 
have a potential in future research with regards to its importance and application in 
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